When Protest Is the Disaster: Constitutional Implications
of State and Local Emergency Power
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ABSTRACT
The President’s use of emergency authority has recently ignited
concern among civil rights groups over national executive emergency
power. However, state and local emergency authority can also be
dangerous and deserves similar attention. This article demonstrates that,
just as we watch over the national executive, we must be wary of and check
on state and local executives—and their emergency management law
enforcement actors—when they react in crisis mode. This paper exposes
and critiques state executives’ use of emergency power and emergency
management mechanisms to suppress grassroots political activity and
suggests avenues to counter that abuse. I choose to focus on the
executive’s response to protest because this public activity is, at its core,
an exercise of a constitutional right. The emergency management onesize-fits-all approach, however, does not differentiate between political
activism, a flood, a terrorist attack, or a loose shooter. Public safety
concerns overshadow any consideration of protestors’ individual rights.
My goal is to interject liberty considerations into the executive’s calculus
when it responds to political activism. I use the case studies of the 2016
North Dakota Access Pipeline protests, the 2014 Ferguson protests, and
the 1999 Seattle WTO protests to demonstrate that state level emergency
management laws and structures provide no realistic limit on the
executive’s power, and the result is suppression of activists’ First and
Fourth Amendment rights. Under current conditions, neither lawmakers
nor courts realistically restrain the executive’s emergency management
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action. I suggest a better check on executive crisis and emergency actions
undertaken in response to mass protest. When the protest is the disaster,
more robust judicial review of executive emergency declarations and the
establishment of a council to guide state and local executives’
emergency/crisis response are crucial.
INTRODUCTION
On August 19, 2014, a police officer stands on the streets of
Ferguson, Missouri, pointing an AR-15 semi-automatic rifle at an
unarmed crowd of protesters.1 “I am going to fucking kill you! Get back,
get back,” he yells.2 When the officer is asked his name, he responds, “Go
fuck yourself.”3 Five days before, on August 15, 2014, a white police
officer, Darren Wilson, shot an unarmed teenager, Michael Brown.
Michael Brown was the fourth unarmed black man killed by a police
officer that year.4 His death ushered in weeks of vigils and mass protests.5
In response, state officials turn to military tactics to suppress the protests,
treating civilians like enemies of war. Police use military grade weaponry
and war tactics for crowd control.6 The Missouri governor declares a state
of emergency and enacts a curfew.7 Militarized policing continues. Arrest
numbers balloon. People are arrested for expressing dissent outside a

1. AMNESTY INT’L, ON THE STREETS OF AMERICA: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN FERGUSON 10
(2014) [hereinafter AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP.], https://www.amnestyusa.org/wp-content
/uploads/2017/04/onthestreetsofamericaamnestyinternational.pdf [https://perma.cc/N8DA-M7JC].
2. Id.
3. Id. It was later discovered that the officer was Lieutenant Ray Albers. Sebastian Murdock,
Confirmed: Cop Who Threatened Ferguson Protesters is Lt. Ray Albers, HUFFPOST (Aug. 20, 2014),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/08/20/ray-albers-ferguson-protesters_n_5696715.html
[https://perma.cc/FEM4-RBGM]; Linda Warren, Veteran Police Officer Who Was Filmed
Threatening to Kill Ferguson Protesters as He Raised His Gun Resigns, DAILY MAIL ONLINE (Aug.
29, 2014), https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2737819/Veteran-police-officer-filmed-threat
ening-kill-Ferguson-protesters-raised-gun-resigns.html [https://perma.cc/PPZ7-8JQ5].
4. Nicholas Quah & Laura E. Davis, Here’s a Timeline of Unarmed Black People Killed by
Police Over the Past Year, BUZZFEED NEWS (May 1, 2015), https://www.buzzfeednews.com
/article/nicholasquah/heres-a-timeline-of-unarmed-black-men-killed-by-police-over [https://perma.
cc/8FJB-T5VU]. This only accounts for the police killings that garnered media attention in 2014.
Further, killings of black women and other minorities have not obtained the same media focus. See,
e.g., Kate Abbey-Lambertz, These 15 Black Women Were Killed During Police Encounters. Their
Lives Matter, Too, HUFFPOST (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/02/13/blackwomens-lives-matter-police-shootings_n_6644276.html [https://perma.cc/NM6K-YPS7].
5. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, AFTER-ACTION ASSESSMENT OF THE POLICE RESPONSE TO THE
AUGUST 2014 DEMONSTRATIONS IN FERGUSON, MISSOURI, at xiii (2015) [hereinafter DOJ FERGUSON
REP.], https://ric-zai-inc.com/Publications/cops-p317-pub.pdf [https://perma.cc/GZ2R-K875].
6. Id. at 53–59.
7. Mo. Exec. Order 14-08 (Aug. 16, 2014) [hereinafter Mo. Exec. Order 14-08],
http://www.sos.mo.gov/library/reference/orders/2014/eo14_08 [https://perma.cc/9HJ8-2X2S].
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police-designated zone or for simply standing in place in public.8 The
Governor activates the National Guard9 one day before the nameless
officer takes aim at protestors with his rifle. But this officer is just one of
many. News reports fill with images of law enforcement officers pointing
weapons at unarmed civilians in the streets of Ferguson.10 In August and
early September, about 300 people are arrested—many violently so—as
they engage in protests and demonstrations in Ferguson.11 When
questioned about the justification for the arrests, police on the ground reply
“I don’t know,” “I can’t answer that,” or “this is a riot situation.”12 This
paper exposes and critiques state executives’ use of emergency power and
emergency management mechanisms to suppress grassroots political
activity and suggests avenues to counter that abuse.
Recently, the exercise of executive emergency power has become
one of the great controversies of the day. Politicians and civil rights
organizations rush to check the national executive as it engages in an
unwise exercise of executive power, and justifies it through the rhetoric of
emergency.13 Most recently, the President declared a national emergency

8. AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 7–8 (“[O]n August 18 that law enforcement
began imposing a rule that protesters must keep walking or face arrest, unless they were in an approved
protest area.”); see also, e.g., Verified Complaint at 1, Abdullah v. County of Saint Louis, 52 F. Supp.
3d 936 (E.D. Mo. 2014) (No. 4:14-cv-1436) (alleging plaintiff was ordered, without lawful
justification and in violation of his constitutional rights, to refrain from standing on public sidewalks
in Ferguson for more than five seconds or risk being arrested).
9. Mo. Exec. Order 14-09 (Aug. 18, 2014) [hereinafter Mo. Exec. Order 14-09],
https://www.sos.mo.gov/library/reference/orders/2014/eo14_09 [https://perma.cc/XW8H-UCMV].
10. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 56; AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at
10, 14, 17; see also images for “Ferguson officer pointing gun at protesters,” GOOGLE,
https://www.google.com/search?q=Ferguson+officer+pointing+gun+at+protestors&source=lnms&tb
m=isch&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwj02r3u2KvkAhW1KX0KHXRmAHwQ_AUIEygD&biw=784&bih=
768 [https://perma.cc/E8VH-WF8J]. Further, there were multiple reports of officers concealing their
identities. AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 18.
11. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 38.
12. AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 15.
13. See, e.g., Peter Baker, Trump Declares a National Emergency and Provokes a Constitutional
Clash, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/nationalemergency-trump.html [https://perma.cc/9YHM-R4A5]; Tamara Keith, If Trump Declares an
Emergency to Build the Wall, Congress Can Block Him, NPR (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.
npr.org/2019/02/11/693128901/if-trump-declares-an-emergency-to-build-the-wall-congress-canblock-him [https://perma.cc/Q23V-TYH3]; Nick Miroff, Lawsuit Seeks to Block Trump From
Restricting Asylum for Migrants Who Enter U.S. Illegally, WASH. POST (Nov. 9, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-issues-decree-limiting-asylumprotection-for-migrants-crossing-illegally-into-the-us/2018/11/09/f856b4ec-e431-11e8-a1c96afe99dddd92_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a02361c5ef1b [https://perma.cc/877M-SJL7];
Benjamin A. Schupmann, Emergency Powers and Trump: Lessons from Carl Schmitt, PUB. SEMINAR
(Mar. 22, 2019), http://www.publicseminar.org/2019/03/emergency-powers-and-trump-lessons-fromcarl-schmitt/ [https://perma.cc/ZXQ5-SR8F]; Michael D. Shear, Trump Claims New Power to Bar
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to divert over $6.5 billion to build a wall at the United States’ southern
border with Mexico.14 This is just one of many actions that this President
has taken under the guise of a crisis. This Article demonstrates that, as
with national executives, we must be wary when state and local
executives—and their emergency management personnel—react in crisis
mode and ultimately make use of expansive emergency powers. There is
an existing body of scholarship examining national emergency powers.15
However, the reality is when crises occur, state and local executives are
the first responders.16 Some state responses have received scholarly
attention. Scholars criticized Louisiana state and local actors’ aggressive,
harmful, and rights-violating actions in the wake of Hurricane Katrina.17
Yet outside the context of natural disaster, the effect of state and local
officials’ emergency responses and policies on individual rights remains
relatively unexamined in legal literature. This Article begins to fill that
Asylum for Immigrants Who Arrive Illegally, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com
/2018/11/08/us/politics/trump-asylum-seekers-executive-order.html [https://perma.cc/86XR-H3NC].
14. Peter Barker, Trump Declares a National Emergency to Build a Border Wall, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/15/us/politics/national-emergency-trump.html
[https://perma.cc/9Q8H-TFG5].
15. See Bruce Ackerman, The Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1029 (2004); Oren Gross,
Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crisis Always be Constitutional?, 122 YALE L.J. 1011
(2003); Lawrence H. Tribe & Patrick O. Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J.
1801 (2004); Amanda L. Tyler, Suspension as an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600 (2009). As
an exception, after Hurricane Katrina some legal scholarship discussed the state and local response to
that natural disaster. See MITCHELL F. CRUSTO, INVOLUNTARY HEROES: HURRICANE KATRINA’S
IMPACT ON CIVIL LIBERTIES (2015) [hereinafter INVOLUNTARY HEROES]; Mitchell F. Crusto, State of
Emergency: An Emergency Constitution Revisited, 61 LOY. L. REV. 471, 480–502 (2015) [hereinafter
State of Emergency].
16. See GEORGE D. HADDOW ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT 2, 99 (3d
ed. 2008); AM. BAR ASS’N, A LEGAL GUIDE TO HOMELAND SECURITY AND EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT FOR STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 151 (Ernest B. Abbot & Otto J. Hetzel, eds.,
3d ed. 2018) [hereinafter ABA GUIDE]; CARMEN FERRO ET AL., NGA CENTER FOR BEST PRACTICES,
A GOVERNOR’S GUIDE TO HOMELAND SECURITY, at v. (Nov. 2010); KEITH BEA, CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL32287, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES
IN THE STATES, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, AND INSULAR AREAS: A SUMMARY 4 (2004) [hereinafter
CRS REPORT SUMMARY]; State of Emergency, supra note 15, at 473–75 (discussing several
emergency situations where state and local governments have experienced difficulty protecting civil
liberties). State executives have statutory emergency management powers. See, e.g., Emergency
Powers of Governor, MO. REV. STAT. §§ 44.022 (1998), 44.100 (2008); Powers and Duties of
Governor, WASH. REV. CODE § 38.08 (2018); State of Emergency—Powers of Governor Pursuant to
Proclamation, WASH. REV. CODE § 43.06.220 (2018). Some mayors also have statutory emergency
powers at the local level. See, e.g., SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.010 (1973) (prior to
amendments) (giving the mayor of Seattle the power to declare a civil emergency); see also Brent
Appel, Emergency Mayoral Power: An Exercise in Charter Interpretation, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 686
(1977).
17. See, e.g., INVOLUNTARY HEROES, supra note 15, at 11–12, 32; State of Emergency, supra
note 15, at 488; PETER B. KRASKA, MILITARIZING THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE
CHANGING ROLES OF THE ARMED FORCES AND THE POLICE 12 (2001).
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void by exposing the harsh and extreme tools that government actors use
when they perceive mass protests as the emergency. I examine the actions
of executive state officials, both before and after the declaration of an
emergency, and demonstrate how they violate protestors’ rights.
Even before executives declare a legal emergency, state and local
first responders—namely the police—can utilize emergency management
tools to suppress protests. However, the emergency declaration aggravates
violations of protestors’ rights. Once there is an emergency declaration,
police are justified to use existing tools more harshly. Police can now
engage in mass and arbitrary arrests. The arsenal of oppressive
government tools expands because violations of emergency rules and
procedures constitute cause for arrest. The executive institutes curfews and
only permits expression in designated areas. Ultimately, I conclude that
these emergency management tools—used by police and officials before
and to a greater extent after the legal emergency—cause irreparable
damage to the First and Fourth Amendment rights of protestors.
I choose to focus on the executive’s response to protest because this
public activity is, at its core, an exercise of a constitutional right. Protest
activity is central “to the history and identity of the liberal, democratic
nation state.”18 In the words of Justice Brandeis,
Those who won our independence . . . believed that freedom to think
as you will and to speak as you think are indispensable to the discovery and the spread of political truth; that, without free speech and
assembly, discussion would be futile . . . that the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people; that public opinion is a political duty, and
that it should be a fundamental principle of American government.19

State and local executives and the laws that govern their emergency
powers ignore the centrality of speech in the American democratic state.
Instead, executives utilize a “one size fits all” emergency management
approach that does not distinguish among the events that precipitate the
perceived crisis. Thus, state and local executives and law enforcement are
free to and do utilize emergency management principles, mechanisms, and
laws to respond to protests in the same manner they would a flood,
earthquake, or tornado.
I conducted interviews with state and local emergency management
officials and personnel and reviewed relevant materials to understand
crisis response structures and mechanisms at the state and local levels. I
learned that the prevailing emergency management all-hazards approach
18. LESLY J. WOOD, CRISIS AND CONTROL: THE MILITARIZATION OF PROTEST POLICING 126
(2014).
19. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).

6

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:1

does not differentiate between the different types of emergencies. State
laws do not distinguish between a purported emergency due to protest,
civil unrest, natural disaster, accident, terrorist event, etc. Thus, the same
rules and principles that give executives great discretion and latitude to
deal with a hurricane, an oil spill, or a terrorist attack govern when dealing
with a protest that the executive decides warrants emergency action or a
state of emergency declaration.20 This results in no realistic limit on the
executive’s power to deal with a purported crisis and no real protection of
individual liberties. Emergency officials view protests as lawenforcement-centric events,21 which means that before and after a legal
emergency is declared, officials give the police free rein to control
protestors. This makes this expansive emergency management power
dangerous, as the government equates protestors with a catastrophe and
provides an executive—and derivatively, the police—the might of the
state to quell individual protestors in the manner that the same would seek
to quell a disaster.
Whenever executives respond to a crisis, they are driven by the need
to maintain public safety. State constitutions and statutes clarify that the
rationale for the executives’ crisis and emergency management role stems
from their duty as protectors of the state and its people.22 Thus, state and
local officials cite public safety as a justification for state and local crisis
response.23 The rhetoric of emergency further serves to neutralize
20. See generally HADDOW ET AL., supra note 16, at chs. 4, 6; CRS REPORT SUMMARY, supra
note 16, at CRS-4; FERRO ET AL., supra note 16.
21. I conducted phone interviews with emergency management officials and personnel in July
2018. These emergency management workers provided me with background and context to
comprehend generally emergency management structures and mechanisms at the state and local level.
Any inferences and analysis based on my research and these interviews are attributable completely to
me and do not represent the opinions of these individuals. On July 1, 2018, I spoke to emergency
management officials at the Missouri State Emergency Managememt Agency. On July 6, 2018, I spoke
to an emergency management official at the Baltimore Mayor’s Office of Emergency Managemnet.
On July 11, 2018, I spoke with an emergency management official at the North Dakota Department of
Emergency Services. On July 12, 2018, I spoke with an emergency management official at the Virginia
Department of Emergency Management. On July 16, 2018, I spoke to an attorney within the North
Carolina Department of Public Safety. Out of respect for the individuals’ privacy, their names have
been omitted. [hereinafter Interviews] (notes on file with author).
22. MO. CONST. art. IV, § 2 (“The governor shall take care that the laws are distributed and
faithfully executed, and shall be a conservator of the peace throughout the state.”); N.D. CONST. art.
V, § 7 (“The governor is the chief executive of the state. The governor shall have the responsibility to
see that the state’s business is well administered and that its laws are faithfully executed. The governor
is commander-in-chief of the state’s military forces . . . and the governor may mobilize them to
execute the laws and maintain order.”); WASH. CONST. art. III, § 8 (“[The governor] shall be
commander-in-chief of the military in the state except when they shall be called into the service of the
United States.”).
23. Mo. Exec. Order 14-08, supra note 7; Mo. Exec. Order 14-09, supra note 9; N.D. Exec.
Order 2016-04 (Aug. 19, 2016) [hereinafter N.D. Exec. Order 2016-04] (on file with author).
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officials’ and police’s behavior that may regularly be perceived by the
public and the courts as abusive and overreaching. While protection of
public safety is an important value and an obligation of government, so is
the protection of constitutional rights. Understanding the difficult tension
between public safety and individual liberties is a consistent theme in legal
and social sciences scholarship.24 This examination contributes to that
discussion where the purported crisis creates an extreme imbalance
between the government’s interest in maintaining order and individual
freedom. State emergency constitutional provisions and statutes generally
make no mention of protection of individual rights.25 This Article
interjects this concern and inquires how individual liberties are furthered
or harmed by the state and local executive’s crisis and emergency
management when responding to public protest. This piece acknowledges
that there is an important interplay between the state and federal actors in
the area of emergency management,26 but leaves others to explore that
relationship. However, scholars have largely ignored the expanse of state
and local emergency power and the harm that it can do to First and Fourth
Amendment rights when protestors and community dissent are the
catastrophe.
In this exploration, I use as sample narratives the 2016 North Dakota
oil pipeline protests, the 2014 Ferguson protests, and the 1999 Seattle
World Trade Organization (WTO) Conference protest. After a brief
description of the events that precipitated protests in my sample
jurisdictions in Part I, this Article explains the emergency powers of
governors and mayors and corresponding emergency management
structures in Part II. Using evidence from the chosen protest jurisdictions,
Part III of this Article examines how executive decisions made during
relevant crisis suppressed protests and violated individuals’ constitutional
rights, primarily First and Fourth Amendment rights. In Ferguson, first
responders used oppressive policing tactics before any emergency
declaration was instituted, thus violating the rights of demonstrators.
Across the three jurisdictions, however, the executive emergency
declaration aggravated the use of these oppressive pre-emergency tactics
24. See, e.g., VICTOR E. KAPPELER & BRIAN P. SCHAEFER, POLICE & SOCIETY: TOUCHSTONE
READINGS (4th ed. 2019); Angela L. Clark, City of Chicago v. Morales: Sacrificing Individual Liberty
Interests for Community Safety, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 113, 143–44 (1999); Robert J. Cottrol &
Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Toward An Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80
GEO. L.J. 309, 314–15 (1991); Peter W. Neyroud, Balancing Public Safety and Individual Rights in
Street Policing, 114 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A. 9231 (2017); V. Plight of the Tempest-Tost:
Indefinite Detention of Deportable Aliens, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1915 (2002).
25. An exception is the Missouri statute 44.101, which prohibits the state or local authority from
interfering with an individual’s Second Amendment right to arm themselves during a state of
emergency. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.101 (2007).
26. See, e.g., ABA GUIDE, supra note 16, at 149–60.
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and opened a Pandora’s box of tools to suppress protest activity. The
Article then asserts in Part IV that there is no effective legislative or
judicial check on the executive’s emergency management decisions.
Lawmakers are unlikely to reign in the executive on behalf of protestors,
and current judicial review is exceedingly deferential to the executive.
This Article then suggests a better check on executive crisis and
emergency actions undertaken in response to mass protest. When the
protest is the disaster, more robust judicial review of executive emergency
declarations and the establishment of a council to guide state and local
executives’ crisis/emergency response are crucial.
I. SAMPLE NARRATIVES
The following three sample narratives are intentionally diverse. Each
of these narratives demonstrate that, regardless of the protest issue or
whether it is the state or the local executive in charge of the response, the
emergency mechanisms in place allowed for the serious abridgement of
protestors’ First and Fourth Amendment rights. I briefly describe them in
reverse chronological order below, and in Part II, I specifically address
each jurisdictions’ emergency mechanisms.
A. The North Dakota Access Pipeline
At the end of 2014, private company Energy Transfer Partners, and
later, its subsidiary Dakota Access, began working on its project to build
a 1,172 mile, thirty-inch underground pipeline to transport crude oil across
four states from North Dakota to Illinois.27 In April 2016, Native American
tribes began protesting pipeline construction, citing environmental and
spiritual objections.28 They also started setting up camps in the area.29 The
tribes grounded their protests on water contamination and religious

27. See Company Overview of Dakota Access, LLC, BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.
com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=264269763
[https://perma.cc/JA4F-UV3U];
Madison Park, 5 Things to Know About the Dakota Access Pipeline, CNN (Aug. 31, 2016),
http://www.cnn.com/2016/08/31/us/dakota-access-pipeline-explainer/index.html
[https://per
ma.cc/N3VL-RBVM]; see also Ryan W. Miller, How the Dakota Access Pipeline Battle Unfolded,
USA TODAY (Dec. 2, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2016/12/02/timelinedakota-access-pipeline-and-protests/94800796/ [https://perma.cc/X3VF-XN2Y].
28. Lauren Donovan, Sioux Spirit Camp to Protest Dakota Access Pipeline, BISMARCK TRIB.
(Mar. 29, 2016), https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/sioux-spirit-camp-to-protestdakota-access-pipeline/article_4773fba1-f3bb-599d-96a4-7d1ddf30690e.html
[https://perma.cc/
R2ZL-GQMD].
29. Id.
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concerns associated with the route of the pipeline.30 They asserted their
duty to guard their ancestral water and land and stressed that they were
“water protectors” instead of protestors.31 In July 2016, the U.S. Corps of
Army Engineers approved the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) project.32
In August, the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe sued to prevent the building of
the pipeline, arguing that the DAPL could potentially contaminate the
Tribe’s drinking water and damage its historically significant sites.33 That
same month, opposition intensified,34 the encampment continued,35 and
North Dakota Governor Jack Dalrymple declared a state of emergency via
Executive Order (EO) 2016-04, citing “illegal protesting” and “unlawful
activity” by individuals at the construction site.36 The order referenced the
right to protest, as well as the need to enforce “the rule of law.”37

30. Lauren Donovan, Spiritual, Political Ride Protests Pipeline, BISMARCK TRIB. (Apr. 1, 2016),
https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/spiritual-political-ride-protestspipeline/article_e9038f1b-e6d4-5d77-9203-f9a3234af3e6.html [https://perma.cc/97M6-YRVH].
31. See Iyuskin American Horse, ‘We Are Protectors, Not Protesters’: Why I’m Fighting the
North Dakota Pipeline, GUARDIAN (Aug. 18, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/aug/18/north-dakota-pipeline-activists-bakken-oil-fields [https://perma.cc/C6TL-NE32].
32. See Park, supra note 27; Company Overview of Dakota Access, supra note 27.
33. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1–3, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v.
U.S. Army of Corps Eng’rs, 255 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. July 27, 2016) (No. 1:16-cv-01534-JEB).
The suit alleged violations of several historic preservation and environmental protection laws in the
Corps’ issuance of final permits for the construction of 1,168-mile-long pipeline meant to transport
crude oil from North Dakota to Illinois. The tribe alleged that no adequate environmental analysis of
the project had been conducted, despite the high probability of leaks which would impact numerous
communities and waterways along the route. The project stopped and started several times due to
changes in federal administration, finally culminating with the granting of a controversial easement
under Lake Oahe by the Trump administration. On June 14, 2017, Judge James Boasberg declared the
permits “did not adequately consider the impacts of an oil spill on fishing rights, hunting rights, or
environmental justice, or the degree to which the pipeline’s effects are likely to be highly
controversial.” Michael Kennedy, The Dakota Access Pipeline, EARTH JUST. (2017),
https://earthjustice.org/cases/2016/the-dakota-access-pipeline
[https://perma.cc/LV78-C7X3].
Despite this ruling, on August 31, 2018, the Corps affirmed the permits. The tribe continued to
challenge the project by filing a supplemental complaint on November 1, 2018. Jan Hasselman, The
Renewed Legal Challenges Against the Dakota Access Pipeline, EARTH JUST. (Nov. 1, 2018),
https://earthjustice.org/features/explainer-renewed-legal-challenge-dakota-access
[https://perma.cc/MLN7-SX33].
34. See Catherine Thorbecke, Timeline of Dakota Access Pipeline Protests, ABC NEWS (Oct.
28, 2016), https://abcnews.go.com/US/timeline-dakota-access-pipeline-protests/story?id=43131355
[https://perma.cc/23SJ-WDQY]; see also Alexander Sammon, A History of Native Americans
Protesting the Dakota Access Pipeline, MOTHER JONES (Sept. 9, 2016), https://www.motherjones.
com/environment/2016/09/dakota-access-pipeline-protest-timeline-sioux-standing-rock-jill-stein/
[https://perma.cc/2S8N-DJL3]; Complaint at 5–9, Dakota Access, LLC v. Archambault et al., No.
1:16-cv-296, 2016 WL 5107005 (D.N.D. Aug. 15, 2016).
35. See supra note 34.
36. N.D. Exec. Order 2016-04, supra note 23.
37. Id.
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A month later, the Governor sent National Guard soldiers to the area
in preparation for a court ruling on whether to permit a challenge to
pipeline construction.38 Protests and arrests continued and magnified.
After the Army Corps issued an eviction notice,39 the Governor issued EO
2016-08 mandating evacuation citing dangerous winter storm conditions
and sanitation;40 however, he did not evacuate the encampment at that
time.41 Water protectors were, however, evacuated after the Governor’s
next evacuation order via EO 2017-01 in February 2017. This last order
cited snow melt and flooding risks.42 Over 750 people were arrested over
approximately ten months in the pipeline protests.43
B. Ferguson
In the summer of 2014, white Police Officer Darren Wilson shot 18year-old Michael Brown, a black teenager, at noontime in the streets of
Ferguson, Missouri. After the shooting, the teenager’s body lay face down
on the street for about four hours, bleeding from at least six gunshot
wounds.44 During this time, a shocked neighborhood poured onto the street
asking questions, taking videos of the scene, posting about the incident on
social media, and calling local news outlets.45 In the days following the
38. North Dakota Governor Calls in the National Guard Ahead of Pipeline Ruling, REUTERS
(Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pipeline-nativeamericans/north-dakotagovernor-calls-in-national-guard-ahead-of-pipeline-ruling-idUSKCN11F031 [https://perma.cc/VQ
A5-EY8W]; Guard Soldiers Activated Amid Dakota Access Pipeline Protests, ARMY TIMES (Sept. 8,
2016),
https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2016/09/08/guard-soldiers-activated-amiddakota-access-pipeline-protests/ [https://perma.cc/GCA8-2NJ3] (reporting that while the Governor
only sent two dozen troops into the area, another 100 were on standby).
39. Letter from John W. Henderson, Dist. Commander, Army Corps of Eng’rs, to Dave
Archambault II, Chairman, Standing Rock Sioux Tribe (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.
indianz.com/News/2016/11/28/armycorps112516.pdf.
40. N.D. Exec. Order 2016-08 (Nov. 28, 2016) [hereinafter N.D. Exec. Order 2016-08].
41. Theresa Braine, DAPL: Evacuation Orders and Snowflakes Fly as Injured Water Protectors
Sue Morton County, INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Nov. 29, 2016), https://indiancountrymedia
network.com/news/politics/dapl-evacuation-orders-and-snowflakes-fly-as-injured-water-protectorssue-morton-county [https://perma.cc/B5J5-HNA3].
42. See N.D. Exec. Order 2017-01 (Feb. 15, 2017) [hereinafter N.D. Exec. Order 2017-01]; see
also David Kaplan, North Dakota Governor Issues Emergency Evacuation Order for Dakota Access
Pipeline Protest Camp, ABC NEWS (Feb. 15, 2017), https://abcnews.go.com/US/north-dakotagovernor-issues-emergency-evacuation-order-dakota/story?id=45522458
[https://perma.cc/45PFT59P].
43. Cliff Naylor, Growth of DAPL Protests Much Bigger than Expected, YOUR NEWS LEADER
(Feb. 23, 2018), http://www.kfyrtv.com/content/news/Growth-of-DAPL-protests-much-bigger-thanexpected-475002913.html [https://perma.cc/V6VS-8YGA].
44. Julie Bosman & Joseph Goldstein, Timeline for a Body: 4 Hours in the Middle of a Ferguson
Street, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/24/us/michael-brown-abodys-timeline-4-hours-on-a-ferguson-street.html [https://perma.cc/E2WJ-6CTM].
45. Id.
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shooting, activists joined residents and large-scale demonstrations
began.46 In the streets of Ferguson, the community, outraged observers,
and activists protested not only the death of Michael Brown, but also the
epidemic of police killings of unarmed black and brown people, police
brutality, and the structural racism of the criminal system.47
Within a week of the shooting, the Governor declared a state of
emergency via EO 14-08, prompted by what he termed “lawlessness” and
“civil unrest.”48 Two days later, the Governor extended EO 14-08 and
issued a state of emergency throughout Missouri.49 This extended EO
referenced protection not only of the “rule of law” but also of civil rights
and the right to peacefully assemble and protest; it omitted the term “civil
unrest” in favor of “conditions of distress.”50 Nevertheless, the Order
imposed a curfew within Ferguson “under the terms and conditions as
deemed necessary by the . . . State Highway Patrol.”51
As further examination will reveal, while the text in the order gave a
nod to civil liberties, the repercussion of the declaration was suppression
of individual liberties.52 The midnight to five a.m. curfew lasted for two
days until lifted by the Governor.53 On the same day he lifted the curfew,
the Governor issued EO 14-09.54 The order called the state National Guard
“to protect life and property” and “support civilian authorities.”55 Further,
it expressly permitted the Highway Patrol to “restrict[] and/or clos[e]
streets and thoroughfares in the City of Ferguson.”56 The National Guard
was active in Ferguson streets for eight days.57 During the initial Ferguson
uprising in August and early September, police arrested about 300
people.58 The Governor terminated the state of emergency on September
46. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at xiii.
47. AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 6; see also Emanuella Grinberg, What
#Ferguson Stands for Besides Michael Brown and Darren Wilson, CNN (Nov. 19, 2014),
http://www.cnn.com/2014/11/19/us/ferguson-social-media-injustice/index.html
[https://perma.cc/
J2BR-7YMR].
48. Mo. Exec. Order 14-08, supra note 7; Press Release, Office of Mo. Governor Jay Nixon,
Statement from Gov. Nixon Regarding the Ongoing Situation in Ferguson and Role of National Guard
(Aug. 18, 2014), http://wayback.archive-it.org/8248/20170107212451/https://governor.mo.gov
/news/archive/statement-gov-nixon-regarding-ongoing-situation-ferguson-and-role-national-guard
[https://perma.cc/6PYS-S98Q].
49. See Mo. Exec. Order 14-08, supra note 7.
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also DOJ FERGUSON REP, supra note 5, at 24.
52. See infra Part III.
53. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 26.
54. Mo. Exec. Order 14-09, supra note 9.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Mo. Exec. Order 14-10 (Sept. 3, 2014) [hereinafter Mo. Exec. Order 14-10].
58. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 38.
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3rd.59 All in all, there was a governor-declared state of emergency in
Missouri for almost twenty days in the summer of 2014.
On November 17, 2014, the Governor again declared a state of
emergency in anticipation of the grand jury decision of whether to indict
Officer Wilson.60 He cited a “possibility of expanded unrest.”61 The
Governor summoned 2,200 National Guard troops to Ferguson62 and gave
primary responsibility for protest policing to the St. Louis County Police
Department—instead of the Ferguson police.63 Protestors criticized the
preemptive gubernatorial emergency for equating protest activity with
violence.64 When the grand jury did not indict Officer Wilson,65 protests
spread throughout the St. Louis area.66 On the day prosecutors announced
the grand jury no bill, police arrested eighty people.67 In the days after the
grand jury decision, law enforcement responded again by violently
suppressing activists’ constitutional liberties.68 The Governor set the state
of emergency to automatically terminate within thirty days of his
November 17th order.69
C. 1999 WTO in Seattle
On November 30, 1999, Seattle hosted the World Trade Organization
(WTO) Conference. Activists with diverse concerns relating to economic,

59. Mo. Exec. Order 14-10, supra note 57.
60. Mo. Exec. Order 14-14 (Nov. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Mo. Exec. Order 14-14].
61. Id.
62. Ellen Wulfhorst, Daniel Wallis & Edward McAllister, More Than 400 Arrested as Ferguson
Protests Spread to Other U.S. Cities, REUTERS (Nov. 25, 2014), https://www.reuters.com/article/ususa-missouri-shooting/more-than-400-arrested-as-ferguson-protests-spread-to-other-u-s-citiesidUSKCN0J80PR20141126 [https://perma.cc/J7GW-Y5QW].
63. Mo. Exec. Order 14-14, supra note 60; see also Mariano Castillo & Dana Ford, Missouri
Governor Declares a State of Emergency in Ferguson, CNN (Nov. 18, 2014), https://www.
cnn.com/2014/11/17/us/ferguson-state-of-emergency/index.html [https://perma.cc/3KCL-DRRK].
64. Monica Davey, State of Emergency Declared in Missouri for Grand Jury’s Decision on
Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/18/us/missouri-governorcalls-out-national-guard-ahead-of-grand-jury-decision.html [https://perma.cc/4G3T-6EEL].
65. Colleen Shalby, Protestors React to Ferguson Grand Jury Decision Not to Indict Darren
Wilson, PBS NEWS HOUR (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/nation/follow-reactionferguson-grand-jury-decision [https://perma.cc/M54B-VEAT].
66. Alan Scher Zagier, Andale Gross, Jim Suhr, & Catherine Lucey, 61 Arrested in Ferguson
After Grand Jury Declines to Indict Police Officer in Michael Brown’s Death, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.dailynews.com/2014/11/24/61-arrested-in-ferguson-after-grand-jurydeclines-to-indict-police-officer-in-michael-browns-death/ [https://perma.cc/8CWU-BPLR].
67. Id.
68. See Complaint at 9–26, Templeton v. Dotson, No. 4:14-cv-2019, 2015 WL 13650910 (E.D.
Mo. Dec. 8, 2014).
69. Mo. Exec. Order 14-14, supra note 60.
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environmental, and social issues descended upon the city in protest.70 On
the afternoon of the WTO Conference, Seattle Mayor Paul Schell declared
a state of emergency in the city, which instituted a curfew and an extensive
“no-protest” zone.71 After the declaration, the Governor immediately
called in 300 state troopers and National Guard troops to assist the Seattle
Police Department with the protest.72 Ultimately, the mayor terminated the
emergency on December 4th. About 500 activists were arrested on
November 30th and December 1st.73
These three sample narratives are applied in the forthcoming
analyses. In the next Part, I will explain state and local emergency
mechanisms generally, as well as specifically in these three jurisdictions.
II. EXPLANATION OF STATE AND LOCAL EMERGENCY POWER AND
BUREAUCRACY
When a crisis occurs within a state, state and local officials are the
first responders who are responsible for managing and controlling the
situation. The U.S. Constitution and federal statutes prevent the national
government from interfering or assisting with a state level emergency
without a preceding request of the state,74 so in the majority of situations,
the national executive will not be involved in the management of a
state-level emergency. All state constitutions contain provisions making
the governor the commander-in-chief of the state military with the power
of maintaining the peace, suppressing insurrection, or both.75 These

70. World Trade Organization Protests in Seattle, SEATTLE MUN. ARCHIVES, http://www.
seattle.gov/cityarchives/exhibits-and-education/digital-document-libraries/world-trade-organizationprotests-in-seattle [https://perma.cc/9YHM-R4A5].
71. Mayoral Proclamation of Civil Emergency, City of Seattle Resolution 30099, Exhibit A
(Dec. 6, 1999) [hereinafter Seattle Emergency Proclamation], https://www.seattle.gov/Documents
/Departments/CityArchive/DDL/WTO/1999Dec6.htm [https://perma.cc/YDW4-9KSC].
72. Day Two, November 30, 1999, WTO HISTORY PROJECT, http://depts.washington.edu
/wtohist/day2.htm [https://perma.cc/R6FN-XJZS].
73. Id.
74. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (containing the “Guaranty Clause,” which delineates that the federal
government will protect states against “domestic Violence,” upon an “Application of the [state]
Legislature, or of the Executive”); 10 U.S.C. § 251 (2017) (requiring there be a state request before
the federal government assists in a state emergency); William B. Fisch, Emergency in the
Constitutional Law of the United States, 38 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 389, 410–11 (1990) (stating that
federal intervention before such a state request may amount to a Guaranty Clause violation, unless the
state is acting in violation of federal law); see also HADDOW ET AL., supra note 16, at xvi.
75. See CRS REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 20, at CRS-4; FERRO ET AL., supra note 16, at 41;
see also MO. CONST. art. IV (making the governor the “conservator of the peace” with the authority
to use the state militia to “suppress and actual and prevent threatened insurrection, and repeal
invasion.”); N.D. CONST. art V, § 7 (making the governor the commander in chief of the military with
the authority to “mobilize them to . . . maintain order”); N.D. CONST. art. III, § 8 (making the governor
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provisions are the foundation of the governor’s emergency power. State
legislatures have further enacted statutes that provide contour to
emergency management powers and structures. Municipal ordinances
provide local executives with similar powers.76 During a crisis, safety is
the dominating concern for the executive and his77 emergency
management team. In this calculus, protection of constitutional liberties is
not an emergency management priority. A review through state
constitutions and statutes dealing with emergencies demonstrates that no
provision exists for the protection of individual rights.78 The language of
state emergency constitutional and statutory provisions—as well as the
resulting emergency management structures—reflect the goal of guarding
security, not individual liberties. The incentive might be different when
some local politicians draft emergency provisions, possibly resulting from
local residents having a stronger influence on these officials. After the
1999 WTO protests, a civil rights provision was added to the Seattle
Municipal Code requiring the mayor to include language in the emergency
declaration that states that any intrusions on individual rights are the least
restrictive necessary to protect life and property.79
In terms of structure, state and local jurisdictions have an emergency
management bureaucracy which answers to the governor or the local
executive, respectively.80 Understanding these bureaucracies and how they
operate when there is a crisis is a challenge. Publicly available materials
on state and local emergency management are limited and do not present
a clear picture of how these officials interact with state and local elected
executives during a crisis. Therefore, my understanding of emergency
the commander-in-chief of the state military); N.D. CONST. art. X, § 2 (specifying that the governor
can utilize the militia to “suppress insurrections and repel invasions”).
76. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.010 (1973) (prior to amendments).
77. I intentionally utilize the male pronoun when referencing state and local executives. I do this
because most are cis male and therefore—in most cases—cis male governors, mayors, and the like
will decide how to manage the crisis as they did in my sample narratives. Governors, NAT’L
GOVERNORS ASS’N, https://www.nga.org/governors-2/ [https://perma.cc/5FMW-22GQ] (providing a
comprehensive list of the U.S.’s governors, ten of whom are female and forty-five of whom are male).
78. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT § 44.101 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-29 (2013). One
exception is that Missouri forbids firearm restrictions during an emergency. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.101
(2007). West Virginia also has a similar statute. W. VA. CODE § 15-5-19A (2014).
79. See Seattle, Wash., City Council No. 113809, Ordinance No. 120606 (codified at SEATTLE,
WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.025 (2001)), http://clerk.seattle.gov/~scripts/nph-brs.exe?
s3=&s4=120606&s5=&s1=&s2=&S6=&Sect4=AND&l=0&Sect2=THESON&Sect3=PLURON&Se
ct5=CBORY&Sect6=HITOFF&d=ORDF&p=1&u=%2F~public%2Fcbor1.htm&r=1&f=G [https://
perma.cc/3CJG-S9SJ].
80. CRS REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 16, at CRS-4–7; see FEMA EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE, Unit Two: How Communities and States Deal with Emergencies and
Disasters, in A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO DISASTER ASSISTANCE 2-1, 2-2 (2001), https://training.
fema.gov/emiweb/downloads/is7unit_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CFX-R5PF].
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management mechanisms is derived from not only my review of statutes,
reports, and materials, but also from my interviews of emergency
management officials and personnel in multiple jurisdictions.81 While
these structures are not uniform across states, generalities do exist. Within
each state executive itself, there is a state emergency management office
headed by either a civilian or the Adjutant General.82 This office may be
situated within a different agency in each state—but is always a part of the
executive bureaucracy.83 Cities have an analogous emergency
management bureaucracy under the control of the chief local executive.84
The role of these offices and their personnel is to coordinate crisis or
emergency response under the direction of the state or local chief
executive.85 My discussions with these emergency management officials
confirmed their focus on public safety, as opposed to any individual liberty
concerns—even when the conversation turned to protest response.86 Law
enforcement is an integral part of state and local emergency management
and officials are routinely the first responders to protests.87
State and local emergency forces—i.e., police—do not await an
emergency declaration to exert substantial control over protestors. Before
a legal emergency, police activate mutual aid agreements to summon
police from other intra-state jurisdictions.88 This acts as a multiplier to
regular police forces. In Ferguson, local police activated these agreements
81. Interviews, supra note 21.
82. See CRS REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 16, at CRS-4–5; see also HADDOW ET AL., supra
note 16, at 106.
83. HADDOW ET AL., supra note 16, at 106.
84. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.047 (2015) (describing Seattle’s Office of
Emergency Management).
85. CRS REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 16, at CRS-4. About thirty states also have created a
commission. Id. These commissions’ purported role is to provide the governor with advice on how to
prepare for and handle an emergency. Id. In my conversations with emergency management officials,
however, I learned that these commissions are not involved in efforts during an actual crisis, but they
may instead provide feedback after the event. See Interviews, supra note 21; see also State Emergency
Response Commission, NORTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, https://www.ncdps.
gov/about-dps/boards-commissions/state-emergency-response-commission [https://perma.cc/6ZBA6XJS]. In North Dakota, the Emergency Commission’s role is also budgetary. See Emergency
Commission, N. D. LEGISLATIVE BRANCH, https://www.legis.nd.gov/assembly/64-2015/committees/
joint/emergency-commission [https://perma.cc/8QV9-UVVU]. During DAPL protests, the
commission met twice to approve funding requests related to protest policing. See Minutes, Special
Emergency Commission Meeting (Nov. 1, 2016), https://sos.nd.gov/files/uploaded_documents/ecm
nnov012016special.pdf [https://perma.cc/FQN6-K7BT]; see also Minutes, Emergency Commission
Meeting (Nov. 30, 2016), https://sos.nd.gov/files/uploaded_documents/ecmn11302016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/MF27-5G3X]. In some states like Missouri and Virginia, the commission has a
specialized focus like environmental hazards. Interviews, supra note 21.
86. Interviews, supra note 21.
87. Id.
88. Id.; see also FERRO ET AL., supra note 16, at 47–51.
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early—before any emergency declaration.89 Police can don military garb
and weapons, ride atop military-grade vehicles, and use them to break up
protests like they did in Ferguson during the seven days leading up to the
gubernatorial emergency declaration.90 Police can use existing law to
arrest. So, while police have some of the same weapons available to battle
civilians whether or not there is an emergency, they are not as likely to use
them as flagrantly and excessively as when there is a sense of an
impending crisis (whether real or fabricated). In other words, without
downplaying the regular police abuse and violence, it is difficult to
imagine police routinely riding down American city streets in military
tanks and tear gassing civilians without the rhetoric of emergency in the
air. The rhetoric neutralizes abusive police conduct because it is perceived
as necessary to emergency management.
The declaration of an emergency further expands executive power
and aggravates the use of oppressive policing tools.91 The statutes and
factual narratives from our sample jurisdictions demonstrate this. During
an emergency, the Missouri and North Dakota governors can singlehandedly control all emergency forces;92 suspend laws and statutes;93 seize
or control modes of transportation;94 control access to emergency areas;95
take and utilize private property;96 and activate the state’s National
Guard.97 Notably, the emergency statutes do not contain an exhaustive list
of the governor’s constitutional power since the language in each statute
clearly states that it is not meant to define or otherwise cabin the extent of
constitutional gubernatorial emergency authority.98 In Seattle, the mayor
has analogous power: he can prescribe a curfew; order evacuation; require
the closing of private businesses, particularly those selling liquor and
firearms; restrict or close access to public streets and places; and generally
make any orders “as are imminently necessary for the protection of life
89. Compare DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 5 tbl.1 (indicating St. Louis police called for
mutual aid the same day Michael Brown was shot on August 9, 2014), with Mo. Exec. Order 14-08,
supra note 7 (declaring first state of emergency in response to protests on August 16, 2014).
90. See generally DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at ch.2; Interviews, supra note 21.
91. State constitutions also grant the governor the power to declare martial law, which is a more
extreme action. Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial Law in the United States, 49 A.F. L. REV.
67, 85 n.93 (2000) (stating “martial law has been imposed on the state level on numerous occasions”).
However, an analysis of martial law is outside the scope of this paper and was not declared in any of
our sample narratives.
92. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100(3)(a) (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05(5) (2013).
93. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.022(3)(1) (1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05(6) (2013).
94. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100(3)(c)(a) (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05(6)(f) (2013).
95. N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17-1.05 (6)(g) (2013).
96. See MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100 (3)(c) (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05(6) (2013).
97. MO. REV. STAT. § 41.480 (1951); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05(6), (8) (2013).
98. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.032(8) (2016); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-171-03(4) (1985).
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and property.”99 However, only a governor can activate the National Guard
as its commander.100
During an emergency, executive orders are the law of the land.101
Police arrest for failure to abide by ad hoc emergency rules, since
noncompliance is criminal—this includes protesting past curfew,
demonstrating or even stepping outside a designated protest zone, or, in
Ferguson, standing still for longer than five seconds.102 In Missouri, as in
Seattle during the WTO protest, nonadherence to the order is a criminal
misdemeanor that can subject someone to a fine or one year in jail.103 In
North Dakota, nonadherence is a fineable criminal infraction.104 The
governor has the authority to declare a state of emergency unilaterally
across his state when his focus is public safety.105 In most states, this power
belongs only to the governor. Missouri—where Ferguson is located—is
one of the exceptions where the legislature can also proclaim an
emergency.106 In the few states where the legislative branch can likewise
institute an emergency, lawmakers rarely, if ever, utilize this power.107
This does not mean that most state statutes do not allow for any legislative
involvement in an emergency. In both Missouri and North Dakota, as well
as in twenty-eight other states, the legislature can terminate the

99. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.020(O) (1992) (prior to amendments).
100. Interviews, supra note 21; see also MAJ. GEN. TIMOTHY J. LOWENBERG, THE ROLE OF THE
NATIONAL GUARD IN NATIONAL DEFENSE AND HOMELAND SECURITY 2 (2014).
101. See MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100(3)(b) (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05 (2013).
102. See infra Part III.
103. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.130(2) (1955) (“Any person violating any rule or regulation adopted
under this law after it has become effective during an emergency or any person or officer violating
any provision of this law shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.”); MO. REV. STAT. § 558.011(6)–
(8) (2017) (stating that the term of imprisonment for misdemeanors is “not to exceed one year”); see
also SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE §§ 10.02.110 (1973) (prior to amendments), 12A.26.040
(2001). The penalty for failure to obey a mayoral emergency order is now 180 days in jail. SEATTLE,
WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.110 (2015) (as amended by City of Seattle Ordinance No. 124849).
104. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 37-17.1-05(7), 12.1-32-01(7) (2017) (defining penalty for
criminal infraction).
105. NAT’L EMERGENCY MGMT. ASS’N, 2018 BIENNIAL REPORT 3 (2018) [hereinafter NEMA
Report]. Even before the triggering event has occurred, every state governor, with the exception of
Minnesota, can declare an emergency also for an impending incident. Id.; see also CRS REPORT
SUMMARY, supra note 16, at CRS-4.
106. See MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100(1) (2008) (stating that an emergency “may be
proclaimed…by resolution of the legislature.”). The state legislatures of Alabama, Missouri, North
Carolina, New Hampshire, Nevada, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and West Virginia also have the power
to proclaim an emergency. See ALA. CODE §31-9-8(a) (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. §414.070 (2009);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:45(2002); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166A-19.20(a) (2012); OKLA. STAT. tit. §
683.9 (2013); W. VA. CODE § 15-5-6 (2014).
107. In 2017, the 206 state level emergencies were all gubernatorial declarations. NEMA Report,
supra note 105, at 3.
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emergency, even if it cannot initiate it.108 In some states, a governor’s
emergency declaration must be continued by the legislature after a certain
108. State legislatures can terminate the emergency in Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Missouri, Montana,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Utah, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See ALASKA STAT. § 26.23.025
(2000); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 26-303 (2015); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-33.5-704(4) (2018); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 28-9 (2010); FLA. STAT. § 252.36 (2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-3-51 (2014); IDAHO
CODE § 46-1008 (2016); IND. CODE § 10-14-3-12 (2010); IOWA CODE § 29C.6(1) (2017); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 48-924 (2002); LA. STAT. ANN. § 29:724 (2009); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 743
(1984); MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 14-107 (West 2006); MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100.1 (2008);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 10-3-303 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 81-829.40 (2019); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 414.070 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:45 (2019); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 29-a (McKinney
2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 166A-19.20 (2012); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05 (2013); OKLA. STAT.
tit. 63, § 683.9 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 401.192 (2009); 35 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7301
(West 2014); 30 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. § 30-15-9 (West 2016); UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-2a-206 (West
2013); W.VA. CODE § 15-5-6 (2014); WIS. STAT. § 166.03 (2009); see also KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RL32288, ALASKA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY
STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL32289, ARIZONA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY
AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-4 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21784,
COLORADO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES
SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21801,
CONNECTICUT EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES
SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21784, FLORIDA
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at
CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21800, GEORGIA EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3
(2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21780, IDAHO EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA
ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21781, INDIANA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND
SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RS21782, IOWA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY
STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RS21788, KANSAS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY
AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004) [hereinafter KAN. CRS REPORT]; KEITH BEA ET AL.,
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32678, LOUISIANA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND
SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-4 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RS21927, MAINE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY
STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RS21929, MARYLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY
AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32318,
MISSOURI EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES
SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004) [hereinafter MO. CRS REPORT]; KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH
SERV., RL32319, MONTANA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY
AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21789,
NEBRASKA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES
SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32320, NEVADA
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at
CRS-3 (2004) [hereinafter NEV. CRS REPORT]; KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RS21790, NEW HAMPSHIRE EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY
AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004) [hereinafter N.H. CRS REPORT]; KEITH BEA ET AL.,
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duration.109 None of the state legislatures in the sample jurisdictions had
any involvement with emergency management during the relevant
protests.
Whether the Missouri and North Dakota governors complied with
their respective statutes when declaring the relevant emergency is
questionable. In Missouri, an emergency is defined as “any state of
emergency declared by proclamation by the governor . . . upon the actual
occurrence of a natural or man-made disaster of major
proportions . . . when the safety and welfare of the inhabitants of the state
is jeopardized.”110 Although the statute references a “disaster of major
proportions,” no provision requires the governor to provide any evidence
of the emergency. The circumstances in Missouri at the time of the
emergency declaration did not amount to a “disaster of major proportions.”
Although some civilians acted violently against police in the streets of
Ferguson, the overwhelming majority of protestors were peaceful.111
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32332, NEW YORK EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND
SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., RS21797, NORTH CAROLINA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND
SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004) [hereinafter N.C. CRS REPORT];
KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21798, NORTH DAKOTA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA
ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RSL32329, OKLAHOMA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND
HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004) [hereinafter OKLA.
CRS REPORT]; KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32328, OREGON EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3
(2004); KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RES. SERV., RL32330, PENNSYLVANIA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (Mar. 23, 2004);
KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21873, RHODE ISLAND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); KEITH BEA
ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32405, UTAH EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND
SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-2 (2004) [hereinafter UTAH CRS
REPORT]; KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32559, WEST VIRGINIA EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004)
[hereinafter W.VA. CRS REPORT]; KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS21879, WISCONSIN
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at
CRS-3 (2004) [hereinafter WIS. CRS REPORT].
109. The legislatures in Kansas, Michigan, Utah, and Wisconsin need to extend the emergency
after certain period. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48-924 (2002); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 30.403 (2002);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 53-2a-206 (2013); WIS. STAT. § 166.03 (2009); see also KAN. CRS REPORT,
supra note 108, at CRS-3; KEITH BEA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32326, MICHIGAN
EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at
CRS-3 (2004) [hereinafter MICH. CRS REPORT]; UTAH CRS REPORT, supra note 108, at CRS-2; WIS.
CRS REPORT, supra note 108, at CRS-3.
110. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.010(6) (2013) (emphasis added).
111. AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 7 (“The vast majority of those
participating in the protests around Michael Brown’s death have been peaceful—as noted by
government officials such as the President of the United States, the Governor of Missouri and Attorney
General along with the Missouri Highway Patrol.”).
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Admittedly, there were large crowds, some looting, and police reports of
gun shots—although no shots were fired at police or any other
individual.112 The situation was certainly serious, but not a major disaster.
As discussed later in this Article, the police response was militaristic from
the day of Michael Brown’s shooting.113 The appearance of war on the
ground likely contributed to the crisis atmosphere; Americans are not
accustomed to seeing tanks on city streets. Still, this last circumstance was
created by law enforcement—not civilians or protestors—and thus should
not factor into the declaration. Instead of citing the “disaster of major
proportions” language, the governor stated in his emergency executive
order that “events occurring in the City of Ferguson . . . have created
conditions of distress for the citizens and businesses of that
community.”114 This is a far cry from a major disaster. Nevertheless, the
citizenry did not bring a court challenge to the emergency declaration. This
is not because all agreed with the governor’s actions,115 instead it is likely
because there is no mechanism to meaningfully challenge a gubernatorial
emergency declaration. This is because the declaration receives highly
deferential review, established by precedents in the courts, and is de facto
not constrained by state legislatures. I will discuss both of these points
later in this Article.116
On the other hand, North Dakota defines an emergency as “any
situation determined by the governor to require . . . response or mitigation
actions to protect lives and property, to provide public health and safety,
or to avert or lessen the threat of disaster.”117 A plain reading of this
definition suggests that the governor’s perception completely dictates
whether an emergency exists in the state. Thus, the emergency is in the
eyes of the governor beholder. However, the emergency statute does
require the North Dakota governor to specify the affected areas; the nature
and incidents leading to the emergency; and what conditions, once
satisfied, would result in the emergency’s termination.118 In the North
Dakota Governor’s EO declaring the emergency, he specified the location
as the Southwest and South Central regions of the state and generally
referenced “illegal” and “unlawful activity” and “illegal protesting
112. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 6–19.
113. Infra Section III(b).
114. Mo. Exec. Order 14-08, supra note 7.
115. Alice Speri, State of Emergency and Curfew in Ferguson After Tensions Flare Again, VICE
(Aug. 16, 2014), https://news.vice.com/en_us/article/9kvmx8/state-of-emergency-and-curfew-inferguson-after-tensions-flare-again [https://perma.cc/RU3Q-6W5V].
116. Infra Sections IV(a), IV(b).
117. N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-04(4) (2013) (emphasis added).
118. Id.
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activity.”119 This conclusory language likely does not satisfy the statute’s
requirement that the executive include the relevant incidents. Further,
there was no mention of what conditions would lead to termination of the
emergency, which begs how the target of the emergency—water
protectors—would know what circumstances would lead to the lifting of
the emergency order. Like the Missouri emergency executive orders, there
was no legal challenge to the pipeline emergency order.
Local executives often can also declare an emergency within their
jurisdiction—although their authority may be more limited. In response to
the WTO protests, it was the Seattle mayor who declared an emergency in
the city.120 Seattle’s list of what can lead to a mayoral emergency
declaration is broad: natural disasters, “riot, unlawful assembly,
insurrection, other disturbance, [or]the imminent threat thereof . . . .”121
Much like the Missouri and North Dakota provisions, it relies on the
judgment of the executive that “extraordinary measures” are needed to
ward off damage to life, property, and maintain “public peace . . . [and]
welfare.”122 However, the Seattle mayor’s emergency declaration required
prompt City Council ratification—which he received.123 Although the City
Council needs to agree with the declaration in Seattle, it is the mayor’s
sole judgment that initially determines whether the declaration is
warranted.
While the governor—and, at times, a local executive—has unilateral
power to declare an emergency, this does not mean that he reaches this
decision without any advice or influence of other state management
officials, or that the top executive only becomes involved in crisis
management when deciding whether to declare an emergency. Instead
governors and local executives are involved in an information loop with
first responders and other emergency management officials from the
moment there is a concern about a potential crisis.124 My conversations
with emergency management officials provided an insider’s view into who
119. N.D. Exec. Order 2016-04, supra note 23.
120. Seattle Emergency Proclamation, supra note 71, at Exhibit A. Because they were mayoral
emergency declarations in Seattle, the declarations needed to and were ratified by the City Council of
the City of Seattle. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE §10.02.010(c) (1973) (prior to
amendments); see also FERRO ET AL., supra note 16, at 17.
121. See SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.010 (1973) (prior to amendments).
122. Id.
123. See
City
of
Seattle
Resolution
30099
(Dec.
6,
1999)
(enacted)
https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/CityArchive/DDL/WTO/1999Dec6.htm
[https://perma.cc/5J4N-D748]; see also SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.010(c) (1973)
(prior to amendments). Even if the City Council voids or changes the declaration, the rejection does
not affect the propriety of emergency actions taken before its rejection. Id.
124. Interviews, supra note 21.
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feeds this information loop during mass protests. Top law enforcement
agents base their perspectives on their officers’ accounts of engagement
with protestors in the field.125 Law enforcement officials feed this
information loop and thus frame the top executive’s perception of the crisis
and of the appropriate response. Police are unlikely to provide a neutral
account of protest events—their accounts are particularly likely to be
biased in the circumstances of Ferguson, where protestors are objecting to
police conduct and violence. Even when the protest does not revolve
around police, law enforcement is trained to view protestors through a lens
of threat assessment where protestors are labeled as the enemy to be
quashed.126 Police interests will be maintenance of public order, at best—
suppression of dissent, at worst. Therefore, top emergency management
executives and personnel will not act to protect the rights of protestors
when they receive one-sided biased information and relevant statutory
provisions ignore constitutional protections.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR PROTESTORS OF STATE AND
LOCAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT
This Part uses the emergency narratives to demonstrate how the
government’s crisis response suppressed protest activities and infringed
on the First and Fourth Amendment rights of protestors and dissenting
community members. In the three cases, the governor or the mayor
declared a legal emergency.127 My investigation shows that the
government viewed the mass protests as a crisis and acted to maintain
order without true regard for constitutional liberties both before and, more
egregiously, after the emergency declaration. My objective is to interject
the protection of constitutional liberties as a measuring stick of the
government response. Where government actors’ preeminent value is
public safety, protection of constitutional liberties is conversely
undervalued.
Even when the language in the executive orders provided lip service
to the right to gather and protest, as did the orders in Missouri and North
Dakota,128 governmental actions hindered these activities. Government
directives undertaken in the name of order and safety—when mass dissent
is the purported crisis—suppress protest activity. These actions most
clearly implicate the First Amendment freedom of speech and assembly
and the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable searches
125. Id.
126. WOOD, supra note 18, at 125.
127. See supra Part I.
128. Mo. Exec. Order 14-08, supra note 7; Mo. Exec. Order 14-10, supra note 57; Mo. Exec.
Order 14-14, supra note 60; N.D. Exec. Order 2016-04, supra note 23.
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and seizures. The accounts below show law enforcement acting in crisis
and, subsequently, emergency mode to maintain or regain control and
order without regard to constitutional liberties. The First and Fourth
Amendment rights of protestors were not an actual part of the equation for
the executive, emergency management officials, and much less police on
the ground.
For the purposes of this discussion, I define threats to the First
Amendment as limitations on the right of assembly and individual
expression.129 This includes limitations on people’s ability to freely
congregate and protest. I define threats to the Fourth Amendment as
government interference with an individual’s physical freedom.130 This
includes detention, arrests, excessive use of force, and intrusive searches.
The other value, of course, is public safety—which the executive may
perceive as having an inverse relationship with individuals’ constitutional
freedoms.131 Through these narratives, harm to First and Fourth
Amendment rights is obvious through government use of excessive and
militarized force, arbitrary and mass arrests, protest zones, curfews, and
ad hoc emergency rules and practices. While some of the problematic
government action resulted in lawsuits, Part IV will discuss why litigation
is an incomplete remedy.
In this Part, I discuss patterns of government conduct across my
selected emergency jurisdictions that impinged on the First and Fourth
Amendment. Before any emergency, the executive can use its regular
police power to arrest under existing criminal laws and summon police
reinforcements from within the state. Surprisingly, it can also use military
tools, weapons, and garb for policing and restrict where individuals can
protest to certain streets. Thus, even before the legal emergency, the
executive can, and sometimes does, use its extraordinary policing
authority during a purported crisis, causing harm to protestors’ liberties as
129. See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
130. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
131. I will resist the temptation to speculate about how public safety was affected by the
government’s constitutionally problematic use of emergency power. I do not know whether people
and property were safer because of the government’s actions in the sample narratives. I can only point
to remarks by protestors, community members, and observers that excessive government response
serves to escalate each event. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 44; REPORT OF THE WTO
ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW COMMITTEE OF THE SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL 11 (Sept. 14, 2000)
[hereinafter SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL REPORT]; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WAR COMES HOME: THE
EXCESSIVE MILITARIZATION OF AMERICAN POLICING 4, 7, 16, 18, 39–41 (2014) [hereinafter WAR
COMES HOME]; AM. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION, WRITTEN SUBMISSION OF THE AMERICAN CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION ON FAILURES OF THE FEDERAL DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE TO ADDRESS POLICE
MISCONDUCT 1, 6 (2017), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/field_document/iachr_statement
_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/A3HN-WXM4]; U.N. Human Rights Council, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on her Mission to the United States of America, 15,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/36/46/Add.1 (Aug. 9, 2017).
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I demonstrate in my discussion of police conduct prior to the governor’s
emergency declaration in Ferguson. After an emergency declaration, the
situation only gets worse for protestors’ First and Fourth Amendment
rights. Once law enforcement perceives that it is responding to an
emergency, it adopts a “no holds barred” approach that results in increased
abuse of activists and their rights. Militarized policing escalates; arrest
numbers soar; and most of the streets become no protest, no dissent zones.
In addition, the legal emergency declaration grants the executive further
policing power. With a preceding emergency declaration, the executive
can activate the National Guard, beckon police from other states, institute
a curfew, or arrest individuals based on ad hoc emergency rules. Below, I
discuss my observation of these patterns in my target emergency
jurisdictions.
A. Enlistment of Multiple Police Forces
High concentration of law enforcement on high alert creates a
volatile environment. In the three protest jurisdictions, law enforcement
presence was highly concentrated. Without an emergency declaration,
police can summon law enforcement from other intrastate jurisdictions
through existing mutual aid agreements when they want reinforcements.132
The larger the crowds that police encounter, the more likely they will call
for additional assistance. In North Dakota and Missouri, the local law
enforcement called upon outside police agencies to provide additional
force. Before any emergency was declared, the St. Louis police chief
employed agreements to call in officers from surrounding Missouri
jurisdictions.133 While there is no clear account of when law enforcement
agents were called in to assist or when they left the Ferguson protests,134
ultimately police from over 50 police departments in the state responded
to the Ferguson protests.135 The situation was different in North Dakota.
Governor Jack Dalrymple utilized the Emergency Management
Assistance Compact (EMAC)—instead of intrastate agreement—to call in
police from six other states.136 EMAC is an interstate agreement that
132. Interviews, supra note 21.
133. See DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 5. These mutual aid agreements do not require
an emergency declaration before intrastate police can be asked to assist. Interviews, supra note 21.
134. See DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 31–38.
135. Id. at xiii, xvi, xxi, 46, 52.
136. Tracy Loeffelholz Dunn, Why Police from 7 Different States Invaded a Standing Rock
Camp—and Other Questions, YES! MAG. (Oct. 31, 2016), http://www.yesmagazine.org/peoplepower/why-the-assaults-on-standing-rock-require-police-from-seven-different-states-and-otherquestions-20161031 [https://perma.cc/7LZC-4C9P]; see also Emergency Management Assistance
Compact (EMAC) 6 U.S.C. § 761 (2018). EMAC is an interstate agreement that requires a state level
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requires a state level emergency declaration for the deployment of out of
state law enforcement assistance.137 Thus, the governor summoned police
from out of state after he declared an emergency. Both EMAC and
Ferguson’s requests for additional law enforcement are mechanisms which
are better suited to respond to natural disasters—not protests.138 This is
because there is no requirement that these various police agencies train
together before providing this type of assistance.139 The merging of
various police forces that are unfamiliar with each other and have not
undergone emergency training together adds to the confusion and
volatility of the situation and can aggravate the potential for constitutional
violations.
In Ferguson, police brought in from various jurisdictions reported
confusion regarding the chain of command and policing tactics during the
protests.140 This led to inconsistent arrest procedures.141 Law enforcement
later reported that it was unclear what amounted to an arrestable offense
and that release procedures were applied differently depending on which
law enforcement agency effectuated the arrest.142 Police abandoned their
regular arrest procedures. Police adherence to these procedures is vital
because they protect individuals’ rights to be free from unreasonable
seizures and allow protestors to express dissent without intimidation.
Abandonment of these procedures led to arbitrary arrests; after the
emergency declaration, officers in Ferguson were “ordered to arrest
demonstrators and charge them indiscriminately,” regardless of whether
these charges could be sustained.143 The message was that people “should

emergency declaration for the deployment of out of state law enforcement assistance. Id. Critics called
this use of EMAC problematic since the federal law was enacted to deal with natural disasters—not
for protest policing. Steve Horn, The Natural Disaster Assistance Law is Why Other States are
Policing the Dakota Access Pipeline Protests, DESMOG (Oct. 27, 2016), https://www.desmogblog
.com/2016/10/27/emergency-assistance-law-dakota-access-pipeline-out-state-cops [https://perma.cc
/QMU2-CTK7]. EMAC was enacted over twenty years ago and has only been used twice during
protests—the pipeline protests and the Baltimore protests over the shooting of Freddie Gray. Id.
137. Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) 6 U.S.C. § 761 (2018).
138. See Horn, supra note 136; see also DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 32.
139. See DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 32, 38–39, 72, 121, 127.
140. Id. at xvi, 13, 20, 37.
141. Id. at 37.
142. Id. at 17, 37.
143. Complaint at 16, Templeton v. Dotson, No. 4:14-cv-2019, 2015 WL 13650910 (E.D. Mo.
Dec. 8, 2014); see also Kimberly Kindy & Wesley Lowery, Ferguson Police Continued Crackdown
on Protestors After Federal, State Interventions, WASH. POST: POL. (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/politics/ferguson-police-continued-crackdown-on-protesters-after-federal-stateinterventions/2014/10/09/15df8a2a-4e40-11e4-aa5e-7153e466a02d_story.html?utm_term=.
19129cfef76d [https://perma.cc/93MM-LXNL] (describing protestors recounting how, as they were
being arrested, police were asking aloud what the charges should be).
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not have been out in Ferguson protesting.”144 Police received the message
to abandon probable cause principles and limitations and instead use
arrests as a tool to curtail protest activity. Arrests became a method to
temporarily incapacitate protest. These are tactics endemic to protest
policing.145 The goal of these arrests was not to obtain a conviction, but to
temporarily detain protestors. Activists were sometimes released from the
jail without information about any charges and were instead told that they
might receive paperwork later informing them of a case against them.146
This practice suggests that in violation of the Fourth and First Amendment
rights of these demonstrators, no probable cause existed at all to support
these arrests. The Supreme Court has found a First Amendment violation
when police have unfettered discretion to arrest protestors because of their
public expressions of dissent.147 This is as true today as when individuals
protested segregation.148 In addition, an arrest that is not supported by
probable cause that the person has committed or will commit a criminal
offense violates the Fourth Amendment.149
B. Militarized Response: Police and National Guard
As many have already observed, American policing is highly
militarized.150 The general militarization of police has led to protest police
tactics characterized by little regard for protestors’ speech rights, “general
intolerance . . . for public disruption, and violent police responses to
public contention.”151 This takes place, remarkedly so, when protestors of
color are involved whom government actors are more likely to view as
threatening or dangerous152 and thus is even more relevant to the Ferguson
and pipeline protests. The police militarization on our protest sites was
unparalleled and surpassed any critiques of warrior tactics in general
American policing, which focus on the routine use of SWAT teams and

144. Complaint at 16, Templeton, No. 4:14-cv-2019.
145. See WOOD, supra note 18, at 38, 78–79.
146. Kindy & Lowery, supra note 143.
147. See Cox v. Louisiana, 85 U.S. 453 (1964).
148. Id.
149. Brinegar v. U.S., 338 U.S. 160, 164–65 (1949).
150. See generally WAR COMES HOME, supra note 131; Liku T. Madoshi, Policing the Police:
Implicit Racial Bias and the Necessity of Limiting Police Discretion to Use Militarized Gear Against
Civilian Protestors, 44 S.U. L. REV. 118, 120 (2016).
151. TIMOTHY ZICK, SPEECH OUT OF DOORS: PRESERVING FIRST AMENDMENT LIBERTIES IN
PUBLIC PLACES 197 (2008).
152. See WOOD, supra note 18, at 41–42 (“[P]olice and intelligence agents are much more likely
to label protestors from poor or racially marginalized communities, ideologically oriented protestors,
and youthful protestors [as uncooperative and threatening.]”).
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paramilitary training for drug enforcement.153 Law enforcement’s use of
military weapons and tactics was extreme during our protests. The warlike atmosphere on the streets of Ferguson arguably generated the
perception that there was an emergency.
Ferguson streets were embattled from the inception of the protests.
Police utilized military grade tactics and tools early and before the
governor declared a legal emergency. From the day of the shooting, police
descended on the Ferguson neighborhood like a military unit. Tactical
police teams rode into the neighborhood in armored vehicles.154 Although
the Governor could not call National Guard troops until after the
emergency declaration, local police departments nevertheless had access
to military equipment and vehicles pursuant to various federal grants and
programs.155 This is the same for most American police forces.156
Demonstrators and community members reported feeling that they were
being invaded and fighting a war against police.157 Camouflaged helmeted
police riding on military vehicles suggest an unfolding catastrophe. These
images—caused by the disproportionate, warrior-like police response—
created, or at least contributed to, the crisis atmosphere.
Numerous reports and images surfaced of police officers in full battle
gear on the ground or atop armored vehicles with the Ferguson community
in their crosshairs.158 Police sprayed protestors with tear gas throughout
many nights.159 These strategies were utilized for crowd control,
intimidation, or to effectuate arrest.160 A SWAT officer was clear when he
stated: “[We]’re going to start gassing people; start pepper balling. We are
not gonna mess around; they’re gonna move.”161 While the officer made
these comments before any legal emergency, it is clear that in his view
there was already an emergency and battle on the Ferguson streets. Of

153. These general critiques of routine militarized policing focus on the use of tactical units and
strategies for regular drug enforcement. See generally WAR COMES HOME, supra note 131.
154. Complaint at 3–5, Quraishi v. Saint Charles County, No. 4:16-cv-1320-NAB, 2019 WL
2423321 (E.D. Mo. June 10, 2019); see also DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 54–55.
155. Oversight of Fed. Programs for Equipping State and Local Law Enf’t: Hearing Before the
S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov. Affairs, 113th Cong. 2 (2014) (Opening Statement of Hon. Tom
Carper, Chairman).
156. Id.
157. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 55–57.
158. See Complaint at 6–7 (photo), 10–11, Quraishi, 2019 WL 2423321; see also PEN AM.,
PRESS FREEDOM UNDER FIRE 2 (2014); AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 14–15.
159. See Complaint at 7, Quraishi, 2019 WL 2423321; DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 6, at
16, 49.
160. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 55–56.
161. Complaint at 7, Quraishi, 2019 WL 2423321.
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course, the emergency declaration did not in any way restrain abusive use
of military equipment and practices.
After the emergency declaration, the Missouri Governor called in
reinforcements in the form of National Guard troops.162 Unlike police, the
National Guard can only be called once an emergency has been
declared.163 The Guard’s presence in response to domestic civil discontent
is not the norm.164 The Guard is, after all, a military unit, as it is usually
activated domestically to assist with natural disasters.165 As of 2014,
almost half of the Guard soldiers had been called to “oversea combat duty
in the past three years.”166 In each of our jurisdictions, the governor called
in the National Guard.167 While there were not the types of abuse
complaints against Guard soldiers or their tactics that there were against
police during the initial Ferguson protests, some community members felt
that the troops’ presence amounted to a military escalation.168 Certainly,
the Guard’s presence did nothing to detract from the air of
militarization.169 Even if Guard soldiers were limited to guarding the

162. Mo. Exec. Order 14-10, supra note 57.
163. NAT’L GUARD BUREAU OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL, 2019 DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
LAW AND POLICY 169 (2d ed. 2018); LOWENBERG, supra note 100, at 4.
164. Lauren Gambino, What is the US National Guard and When is It Called Up?, GUARDIAN
(Aug. 18, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/18/what-is-national-guard-fergusonmissouri [https://perma.cc/Y7J6-E5HN].
165. See id.
166. LOWENBERG, supra note 100, at 4.
167. In Ferguson, two days after the Governor declared a state of emergency, he activated the
National Guard. See Mo. Exec. Order 14-09, supra note 57. In Seattle, the mayor requested that the
Governor provide assistance after declaring an emergency in the city. See See City of Seattle
Resolution
30099
(Dec.
6,
1999)
(enacted)
https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/
Departments/CityArchive/DDL/WTO/1999Dec6.htm [https://perma.cc/5J4N-D748]. The Governor
then activated the National Guard, as well as State Troopers. SEATTLE POLICE DEP’T, THE SEATTLE
POLICE DEPARTMENT AFTER ACTION REPORT: WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION MINISTERIAL
CONFERENCE 41 (2000) [hereinafter SEATTLE AFTER ACTION REP.], http://media.cleveland.
com/pdextra/other/Seattle%20PD%20after%20action%20report.pdf [https://perma.cc/4CZ7-PANV].
In the pipeline protests, the Governor activated the National Guard about three weeks after declaring
an emergency in the area. Eric M. Johnson, North Dakota Governor Calls in National Guard Ahead
of Pipeline Ruling, REUTERS (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-pipelinenativeamericans/north-dakota-governor-calls-in-national-guard-ahead-of-pipeline-ruling-idUSKCN
11F031 [https://perma.cc/2CUN-9PWQ]. About 500 National Guard soldiers were ultimately
deployed in relation to the pipeline protests. Rebecca Hersher, Key Moments in the Dakota Access
Pipeline Fight, NPR (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/02/22/
514988040/key-moments-in-the-dakota-access-pipeline-fight [https://perma.cc/94AL-8CZ8].
168. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 26.
169. When questioned whether the National Guard would improve the situation in Ferguson,
Professor Jim Graig, an expert in military and veteran studies, remarked “The National Guard by
design is militarized, and so that doesn’t theoretically de-escalate the situation.” Gambino, supra note
164.
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police command post as the Missouri Governor declared,170 their presence
supported abusive police conduct. The Guard soldiers were not present to
protect protestors, but to protect police.
A Department of Justice (DOJ) investigation of Ferguson concluded
that military weapons, equipment, and tactics were used inappropriately
throughout the Ferguson protests.171 Improper practices included armed
sniper surveillance, indiscriminate use of tear gas, and employing canines
for crowd control.172 Police “indiscriminately [shot] tear gas and other
projectiles into a residential area.”173 These tactics violated the First and
Fourth Amendment rights of protestors, since they amounted to excessive
force and intimidation of activists. Police use of force must be reasonable
in order to comply with the Fourth Amendment.174 Further, violent arrests
curtail protestors’ First Amendment rights because they intimidate
activists.175 When the police use of force is unreasonable, individuals feel
unsafe engaging in protests.
Some months after Governor Nixon terminated the initial state of
emergency, he declared a second emergency in anticipation of the grand
jury’s November decision of whether to indict Officer Wilson and
immediately activated the National Guard.176 This time, having
experienced the militarized response to the initial protests, activists
complained that Guard presence was unnecessary and extreme.177 They
called the activation of Guard troops, on top of 1,000 police units, an
“overreaction.”178 Ferguson protestors placed the problematic presence of
the Guard in the context of their deployment throughout American history
to annihilate Black dissent.179 In denouncing Guard presence, a protest
leader stated, “Remember we haven’t done anything. Today is the 102nd
day of protests and there have been two days of looting out of 102 days,
so what it shows us is that Missouri is afraid of black bodies
170. Monica Davey, National Guard Troops in Ferguson to Quell Disorder, N.Y. TIMES (Aug.
19, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/20/us/ferguson-missouri-protests.html [https://perma.
cc/4YQQ-M2LP].
171. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at xvii, 59.
172. Id. at 43 (canines), 51 (tear gas), 60 (snipers).
173. Complaint at 7, Devereaux v. County of Saint Louis, No. 4:15-cv-00553-RWS (E.D. Mo.
Mar. 30, 2015).
174. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989); see also DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra
note 5, at 41.
175. See generally ZICK, supra note 151.
176. Mo. Exec. Order 14-14, supra note 60.
177. Lily Workneh, Will the National Guard Really Help Keep the Peace, HUFFPOST (Nov. 18,
2014), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/national-guard-keep-peace_n_6181802?guccounter=1 [https:
//perma.cc/EKP2-ZJ9P].
178. Id.
179. Id.
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assembling.”180 The Guard’s historically violent involvement with Black
protestors cannot be ignored,181 and its presence is naturally reminiscent
of past injustice for African American activists. The concern that Guard
troops would aggravate the war-like climate and response was reinforced
after the discovery of internal communications within the Missouri Guard
that referred to protestors as “enemy forces.”182 Documents describing the
Guard’s mission in Ferguson labeled protestors as hate groups.183
With 2,200 Guard troops as backup,184 police again responded with
extreme force to the community’s disdain at the grand jury’s refusal to
indict Officer Wilson.185 In the Templeton v. Dotson complaint, six
plaintiffs described how they, and many others, were peacefully protesting
this failure to indict, as well as other police shootings of unarmed black
men and general police violence against the community.186 According to
the complaint, unidentifiable police—without name badges and in riot
gear—conducted mass random and violent arrests, beating and tear
gassing activists and observers without warning.187 The Templeton
complaint describes this police behavior over several days in late
November 2014.188 The district court granted plaintiffs’ requests for a
temporary restraining order preventing police from using chemical agents
180. Id.
181. Cassie Owens, What Can Happen When the National Guard Is Called into a City Over
Riots, NEXT CITY (Apr. 29, 2015), https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/city-riots-baltimore-wilmingtonnational-guard-in-cities [https://perma.cc/3KT6-5RS7]; see, e.g., Anjuli Sastry, When LA Erupted in
Anger: A Look Back at the Rodney King Riots, NPR (Apr. 26, 2016), https://www.npr.org/
2017/04/26/524744989/when-la-erupted-in-anger-a-look-back-at-the-rodney-king-riots
[https://
perma.cc/GG3C-D7GF] (stating that 10 individuals were “shot and killed by LAPD officers and
National Guardsmen” as they took part in the protests against the police force’s brutal treatment of
African American Rodney King). See generally Alan Flippen, Not Just Ferguson: National Guard
Has a Long History with Civil Unrest, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com
/2014/08/19/upshot/not-just-ferguson-national-guard-has-a-long-history-with-civil-unrest.html [https
://perma.cc/6KNV-ADC3] (stating the “[u]se of the National Guard to quell civil disturbances,
especially race-related ones . . . has a long history in the United States”).
182. Barbara Starr & Wesley Bruer, Missouri National Guard’s Term for Ferguson Protestors:
‘Enemy Forces,’ CNN (Apr. 17, 2015), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/17/politics/missouri-nationalguard-ferguson-protesters/index.html [https://perma.cc/9MBY-3K55].
183. Id.
184. See Ben Kesling, Pervaiz Shallwani & Mark Peters, Ferguson Beefs Up Response, WALL
ST. J. (Nov. 26, 2014), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ferguson-beefs-up-response-after-violence1416964911?tesla=y [https://perma.cc/V7PR-R7RD].
185. Complaint at 8, Templeton v. Dotson, No. 4:14-cv-2019, 2015 WL 13650910 (E.D. Mo.
Dec. 8, 2014); Temporary Restraining Order at 1, Templeton, 2015 WL 13650910; see also Curfew in
Effect as Seattle Struggles to Control WTO Protests, CNN (Nov. 30, 1999), http://www.cnn.com
/US/9911/30/wto.04/ [https://perma.cc/U5J8-W38Y].
186. Complaint at 10, 12–13, Templeton, 2015 WL 13650910.
187. Id. at 10, 12–13.
188. Id.
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to disperse peaceful protestors.189 The district court concluded that people
were unable to avoid chemical agents exposure because officers were
using the agents “to disperse crowds of protestors . . . who were not
engaged in violent or criminal activity”—without warning and in violation
of the First Amendment.190
This type of police activity is unconstitutional because it precludes
protests and also chills individuals’ speech and assembly rights.191 The
district judge in Templeton properly enjoined the government’s use of tear
gas to stop the demonstrations. Peaceful protestors are protected by the
First Amendment.192 This is so even when observers or others present
become “unruly.”193 The violent actions of a few cannot restrict the First
Amendment rights of others. Government policies are clear: tear gas
should only be used after proper warnings so that individuals can
disperse.194 As a matter of fact, the U.S. military cannot use tear gas in
international warfare against its enemies.195 This is because tear gas can
be dangerous and cannot be controlled once fired.196 Incomprehensibly,
the government can use tear gas on its own people.197 Therefore if used,
chemical agents should only be employed as a tool of “last resort” during
protests and only after protestors have received a warning and had an
189. Temporary Restraining Order at 3, Templeton, 2015 WL 13650910.
190. Id. at 2–3. The court eventually dismissed at the request of all parties pursuant to a
settlement agreement establishing limitations and conditions under which law enforcement could
utilize tear gas in Ferguson. See Settlement Agreement at 1, Templeton, 2015 WL 13650910; Rachel
Lippmann, Settlement Reached: Police Must Warn Before Use of Tear Gas or Other Chemical Agent,
ST. LOUIS PUBLIC RADIO (Mar. 26, 2015), http://news.stlpublicradio.org/post/settlement-reachedpolice-must-warn-use-tear-gas-or-other-chemical-agents#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/9PSF-DRNE].
The District Court further retained the ability to supervise compliance with the agreement. See Order
of Dismissal, Templeton, 2015 WL 13650910.
191. See Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1968); see also Lamont v. Postmaster Gen.
of U.S., 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
192. Gregory, 394 U.S. at 111.
193. Id.
194. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 49.
195. Chemical Weapons Convention, art. I, Jan. 13, 1993, 120 Stat. 170 (as amended), 1975
U.N.T.S. 45. The United States is one of 165 signatories. Id. The U.S. Senate voted to ratify the
convention on April 24, 1997. Resolution of Advice and Consent to Ratification of Chemical Weapons
Convention, S. Res. of Treaty Doc. 103-21, 105th Cong. (1997); see also Louis Jacobson, Teargas
was Banned for Warfare in 1993 but Police Still Use It, Viral Meme Says, POLITIFACT (Aug. 26, 2014),
https://www.politifact.com/truth-o-meter/statements/2014/aug/26/facebook-posts/tear-gas-wasbanned-warfare-1993-police-1997/ [https://perma.cc/CWL5-XUG8].
196. Angus Chen, How Tear Gas Works: A Rundown of the Chemicals Used on Crowds, PBS
(Dec. 2, 2018), https://www.pbs.org/newshour/science/how-tear-gas-works-a-rundown-of-thechemicals-used-on-crowds [https://perma.cc/Y9EH-XA9L].
197. Chemical Weapons Convention, art. II, Jan. 13, 1993, 120 Stat. 170 (as amended), 1975
U.N.T.S. 45 (“Purposes not prohibited under this convention” to include “[l]aw enforcement including
domestic riot control purposes.”).
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opportunity to leave the area. In contravention of this principle, tear gas
seemed to be first responders’ preferred tool in Ferguson.198
Furthermore, according to the Missouri statute, an officer can only
arrest for refusal to disperse if “[a] person . . . present at the scene of an
unlawful assembly . . . or of a riot . . . knowingly fails or refuses to obey
the lawful command of a law enforcement officer to depart from the
scene.”199 Thus, if there was no command, there was no crime of refusal
to disperse. Even if Ferguson protestors had been able to avoid chemical
exposure, police would still be violating the rights of individuals who had
to flee because the officers were precluding their ability to protest on
public streets. Directing police officers to break up peaceful protests
through force, including tear gas and other chemical irritants or agents,
violates clearly established First Amendment principles.200 The intent of
state officials could not have been clearer, considering admissions by
police officers that their marching orders were to stop the protests.201
Courts must closely scrutinize restrictions on speech and assembly on
streets because they are traditional public forums.202 “[S]treets and
parks . . . ‘have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public
and, time out of mind, have been used for the purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions.’”203
Furthermore, the government need not completely preclude speech
to violate the First Amendment. Instead, inhibition of speech in traditional
public forums is unwarranted and unconstitutional without a compelling
state interest and a narrowly tailored restriction.204 The indiscriminate use
of chemical agents not only prevents peaceful protests, but also dissuades
others from engaging in demonstrations out of fear. Government
intimidation tactics will lead many to “simply abstain from protected
speech, harming not only themselves but society as a whole, which is
deprived of an uninhibited marketplace of ideas.”205 The question of
whether there is an unconstitutional chilling effect on the First
Amendment depends on gauging the balance between the level of
198. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 49.
199. MO. REV. STAT. § 574.060 (2019).
200. Keating v. City of Miami, 598 F.3d 753, 767 (11th Cir. 2010).
201. Complaint at 16, Templeton v. Dotson, No. 4:14 cv 2019, 2015 WL 13650910 (E.D. Mo.
Dec. 8, 2014).
202. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
203. Id. (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 515 (1939)).
204. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen. of U.S., 381 U.S. 301, 309 (1965); see also ZICK, supra note
151, at 54.
205. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119 (2003).
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government deterrence and the purported state interest.206 While the
purported government interest is public order on the streets of Ferguson, a
state strategy that precludes all dissent by force—not just violent dissent—
fails as overbroad,207 because it suppresses peaceable public expression.
In the pipeline protests, the government response shifted from
regular policing to a militarized response after the Governor’s emergency
declaration. Early in those protests, police did not resort to military grade
weapons or tactics. Water protectors set up camp in objection to any
pipeline construction starting in April 2016. While some arrests began
months later in August, there were no reports of a militarized police
presence.208 Photos of that time period show police in regular uniform
instead of military garb.209 The governor declared a legal emergency on
August 19, 2016,210 and government aggression escalated.
About three weeks after the emergency declaration, the Governor
activated 100 National Guard troops to the pipeline area, with two dozen
troops to conduct traffic checks while armed.211 Within three months, this
number increased to 500 Guard soldiers.212 Complaints of government
intimidation referenced actions of the police and Guard soldiers.213 Sioux
206. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958).
207. The modern First Amendment overbreadth doctrine reviews laws determine “whether a
statute is too sweeping in coverage—and if so, invalid on its face.” The First Amendment Overbreadth
Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844, 845 (1970) (internal citation omitted); see, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson,
405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972).
208. See Lauren Donovan, Movie Star Joins Pipeline Protest as 10 Arrested in Heavily Policed
Scene, BISMARCK TRIB. (Aug. 11, 2016), https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/
movie-star-joins-pipeline-protest-as-arrested-in-heavily-policed/article_962ce3ce-8ecc-5897-b727ddd8d2f28c69.html [https://perma.cc/Q4UN-GZ9P]; Caroline Grueskin, Charges Filed Against
Protestors, BISMARCK TRIB. (Aug. 12, 2016), https://bismarcktribune.com/news/local/crime-andcourts/charges-filed-against-protesters/article_27990d77-a2e2-5523-9451-c12f1bcc5841.html
[https://perma.cc/8GAJ-Q3RM].
209. See, e.g., Donavan, supra note 208; Grueskin, supra note 208.
210. See N.D. Exec. Order 2016-04, supra note 23.
211. Johnson, supra note 167; see also Caroline Grueskins & Blair Emerson, North Dakota
National Guard to Provide Backup to Law Enforcement, BISMARCK TRIB. (Sept. 8, 2016),
https://bismarcktribune.com/news/state-and-regional/north-dakota-national-guard-to-provide-backup
-to-law-enforcement/article_57090461-12d0-5376-bf6b-041a4511ce4f.html [https://perma.cc/5F5BAJT9].
212. Hersher, supra note 167.
213. See Letter from Dave Archambault, II, Sioux Tribe Chairman, to Loretta E. Lynch, Atty.
Gen. of U.S. (Oct. 24, 2016) [hereinafter Archambault Letter], https://www.documentcloud.org
/documents/3189653-Lltr-to-AG-Lynch-Re-Dakota-Access-10-24-16-Pdf-1.html [https://perma.cc/
5W7Q-ZJPK]; EDWARD JOHN, REPORT AND STATEMENT FROM CHIEF EDWARD JOHN EXPERT
MEMBER OF THE UNITED NATIONS PERMANENT FORUM ON INDIGENOUS ISSUES, FIRSTHAND
OBSERVATIONS OF CONDITIONS SURROUNDING THE DAKOTA ACCESS PIPELINE (Nov. 1, 2016)
[hereinafter JOHN REPORT], https://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/2016/Docs-updates
/Report-ChiefEdwardJohn-DAPL2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/YT4P-DTEV].
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Tribe Chairman David Archambault expressed that checkpoints guarded
by military vehicles and heavily armed soldiers intimidated water
protectors.214 The emergency declaration provided the Governor not only
with the ability to mobilize Guard troops, but also to make use of their
“federally assigned . . . vehicles . . . and other equipment.”215 The
Chairman also cited intimidation by increasingly militarized police
forces.216 Police shifted their tactics to include the use of chemical agents
at the pipeline site. Law enforcement utilized a range of military
weapons—including pepper spray, tear gas, long range acoustic devices,
water hoses and cannons, and rubber bullets. Human rights groups echoed
the Chairman’s concerns asserting that law enforcement used militarized
tactics to intimidate peaceful demonstrators.217
Plaintiffs in the Dundon v. Kirchmeier complaint recounted how law
enforcement confronted them and other water protectors during a late
November spiritual ceremony and sprayed them in subfreezing
temperatures with water cannons mounted atop an armored vehicle.218
People were sprayed for ten minutes at a time for a whole hour.219 Police
hit activists (even on their faces) with tear gas grenades.220 One woman
suffered permanent injury to her eye when she was hit with a tear gas
canister.221 Ultimately, twenty-six people required hospitalization.222
Plaintiffs claimed that these police actions amounted to a violation of
protestors’ First and Fourth Amendment rights because this violence
intimidated protestors and therefore chilled their expression, and this use
of weapons amounted to excessive force.223 The Dundon matter is
currently pending before the district court. However, the case has a
checkered past. In 2017, the district court denied the plaintiff’s motion for
214. Archambault Letter, supra note 213.
215. National Guard Regulation 500-5 (Aug. 18, 2010).
216. Archambault Letter, supra note 213.
217. Letter from Board of Directors, Amnesty Int’l U.S.A., to Doug Berman, Governor of N.D.,
& Wayne Stenehjem, Atty. Gen. of N.D. (Mar. 9, 2017) https://www.amnestyusa.org
/files/letter_to_gov_and_ag_of_nd.pdf [https://perma.cc/S9QM-JH87]; see also JOHN REPORT, supra
note 213.
218. First Amended Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief at 2, 14, 19, Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 1:16-cv-406 (D.N.D. Nov. 28, 2016).
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1–2, 14, 17, 21, 25.
221. Id. at 18, 31. A medical expert explained that she might forever be blind in her right eye.
Id.
222. Julia Carrie Wong, Dakota Access Pipeline: 300 Protestors Injured After Police Use Water
Cannons, GUARDIAN (Nov. 21, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/nov/21/
dakota-access-pipeline-water-cannon-police-standing-rock-protest [https://perma.cc/5BLT-FYD4].
223. First Amended Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief at 37–39, Dundon, No. 1:16-cv-406 (D.N.D. Feb. 27, 2018).
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an injunction preventing law enforcement from using less-than-lethal
weapons, water hoses, and water canons to disperse protestors, finding that
plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their claims.224 The
judge’s finding regarding the First Amendment claim was that water
protectors were located on a bridge closed to public and thus, had no right
to protest there.225 On the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim, the
judge essentially declared that the water protectors were never arrested or
detained, and thus were free to leave the area when confronted by police
with water hoses.226 In addition, the judge labeled the situation as chaotic,
and ruled that he could not conclude at the injunction stage that it was
unreasonable for police to utilize these weapons against water
protectors.227
The district judge was too quick to deny the injunction. The Fourth
Amendment does not permit police to use excessive force during any
seizure.228 According to the Supreme Court in Graham v. Connor, force is
excessive and unconstitutional when it is not objectively reasonable in
light of existing circumstances.229 Although it is easiest to demonstrate that
someone is seized when police arrest them, the Fourth Amendment applies
to law enforcement seizures that are less than arrests. A seizure occurs
whenever an individual reasonably believes that she is not free to leave.230
Contrary to the district judge’s assertion that “protestors could have easily
removed themselves from the . . . [b]ridge and the presence of law
enforcement,”231 the Dundon plaintiffs explained that they were unable to
escape the “unrelenting bombardment of [Specialty Impact Munitions],
chemical agents, and high-pressure water.”232 In their amended complaint,
plaintiffs further explained both that “[c]louds of chemical agents”
prevented egress, and that other did not want to leave other injured water
protectors to fend for themselves.233 Plaintiffs were effectively seized on
224. See Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 35, Dundon, No. 1:16cv-406 (D.N.D. Feb. 7, 2017). The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying of the
injunction. Dundon v. Kirchmeier, 701 F. App’x 538 (8th Cir. Nov. 14, 2017) (per curiam).
225. See Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 29–30, Dundon, No.
1:16-cv-406 (D.N.D. Feb. 7, 2017).
226. Id. at 31.
227. Id. at 32.
228. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
229. Id.
230. See Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 573 (1988).
231. Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 31, Dundon, No. 1:16-cv406 (D.N.D. Feb. 7, 2017).
232. Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction at 8, Dundon, No. 1:16-cv-406 (D.N.D. Nov. 28, 2016).
233. First Amended Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief at 15, Dundon, No. 1:16-cv-406 (D.N.D. Feb 27, 2018).
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the bridge once police began the barrage of water and chemical agents.
The concept of seizure is complicated in protest cases where police use
force to disperse protestors with courts reaching different conclusions
about whether an activist was seized depending on the jurisdiction.234
However, even in jurisdictions that define a seizure narrowly when police
seek to disperse individuals, the court will still conclude that police have
seized a person who is incapacitated by chemical agents and submits to
police authority.235 In Dundon, the judge ignored plaintiffs’ statements that
they were incapacitated and trapped by police use of less than lethal
weapons.
Graham’s reasonableness analysis requires the balancing of the force
applied by the government with the need for that force.236 The factors that
the court must consider in this analysis are “the severity of the crime at
issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the
officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting
to evade arrest by flight.”237
Taking into account these factors, there simply was no need for the
level of force used by police against the water protectors in Dundon. While
the judge articulated the Graham factors, he did not apply them to the facts
in the case.238 A methodological application of the factors would have
concluded that no violent crime was afoot—most water protectors were,
at worst, trespassers if the bridge was actually closed to the public. There
was no immediate safety threat because most demonstrators were
peaceful—as recognized by the judge.239 Finally, water protectors were
not a flight risk. However, the judge completely deferred to police actions,
using law enforcement’s own decision to call in additional units as proof
234. See, e.g., Lamb v. City of Decatur, 947 F. Supp. 1261, 1263–66 (D. Ill. 1996) (finding
protestors who were tear gassed by police were seized and concluding the question of whether police
used excessive force was properly for the jury since police were on notice that excessive force against
demonstrators is prohibited); see also Marbet v. City of Portland, No. CV 02-1448-HA, 2003 WL
23540258, at *10 (D. Or. Sept. 8, 2003). See generally Renee Paradis, Carpe Demonstrators: Towards
a Bright-Line Rule Governing Seizure in Excessive Force Claims Brought by Demonstrators, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 316 (2003). Contra Buck v. City of Albuquerque, No. 04-1000 JP/DJS, 2007 WL
9734037, at *30–33 (D.N.M. Apr. 11, 2007) (determining whether protestors were seized based on if
each was surrounded by tear gas and police).
235. See Buck, 2007 WL 9734037, at *30.
236. Headwaters Forest Defense v. City of Humboldt, 240 F.3d 1185, 1198–99 (9th Cir. 2000).
237. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989); see also Lamb, 947 F. Supp. at 1265 (quoting
the Graham factors).
238. Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 30–32, Dundon, No. 1:16cv-406 (D.N.D. Feb. 7, 2017). Contra Lamb, 947 F. Supp. at 1265 (applying factors methodically to
police use of pepper spray against protestors).
239. Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 14, Dundon, No. 1:16-cv406 (D.N.D. Feb. 7, 2017).
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that the level of force was warranted.240 This is despite the judge’s
recognition that police used water hoses and chemical agents
indiscriminately.241
It cannot be reasonable for police to spray demonstrators with water
hoses or cannons to the point of hypothermia and shoot tear gas grenades
at mostly peaceful protestors because it is a direct impediment to their
constitutionally protected rights to peaceful protest. The fact that those on
the bridge were engaged in First Amendment activity means that the
government actions must be more scrupulously reviewed.242 The district
judge ignored this prescription and thus facilitated police abuse of activists
and the quelling of dissent.
Regarding their First Amendment claims, Dundon plaintiffs
contended all along that the bridge was open to the public during the
event.243 If this is the case, the police actions in Dundon violated water
protectors’ First Amendment rights, just like the actions of Ferguson law
enforcement in Templeton. The bridge is like a street, park, or sidewalk,
which are considered traditional public forums.244 The district judge
asserted that water protectors would have needed to obtain permits to
protest even if the bridge was not closed to the public or even if they were
protesting on the streets.245 Government authorities may require protestors
to obtain a permit.246 However, even with a permitting requirement, the
district judge would still have to evaluate the process to determine that it
did not discriminate based on the content of the speech and was instead a
neutral time, place or manner restriction.247 The district judge did not
engage in any of this analysis.
As previously mentioned, the Seattle mayor declared an emergency
on the first afternoon of the WTO Conference. Like police in my other
narratives, Seattle law enforcement also used military weapons
240. Id. at 32–33.
241. Id.
242. See Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 564 (1948) (stating in a search warrant case
that where the materials sought by the government might be protected by the First Amendment the
Fourth Amendment requirements “must be applied with ‘scrupulous exactitude’”); see also Lamb, 947
F. Supp. at 1263 (quoting same Zurcher language).
243. Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at
10–11, Dundon, No. 1:16-cv-406 (D.N.D. Nov. 28, 2016); First Amended Civil Rights Class Action
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 2, Dundon, No. 1:16-cv-406 (D.N.D.
Feb. 27, 2018).
244. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
245. Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 30, Dundon, No.16-cv-406
(D.N.D. Feb. 7, 2017).
246. Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574–76 (1941).
247. Id. at 576–78.
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inadequately and dangerously on WTO protestors. Police outfitted in
militaristic garb used tear gas, pepper spray, or rubber bullets to clear
protestors.248 At one site, police sprayed individuals sitting down in protest
after forcibly removing their masks.249 There were accounts of teams of
police jumping out of vehicles to gas and shoot rubber bullets at
unsuspecting activists.250 Careless use of these weapons even endangered
individuals uninvolved with the protests.251 At the mayor’s request, state
troopers participated in the policing of the WTO protests.252 The State
Patrol Chief later criticized the use of chemical agents by Seattle police
calling them “pointless ‘gas and run’ tactics.”253 These accounts of abusive
use of chemical weapons by police were not few and far between, but
rampant.254
C. Mass Arrests
In the protest jurisdictions, police used arrests to incapacitate
protestors. When police use arrests in this manner, their objective is not to
obtain a conviction, but rather to temporarily detain individuals and stop
protesting activity. Thus, the police do not assess whether there is probable
cause of criminal conduct as the Fourth Amendment requires, and instead
they arrest to suppress dissent in contravention of First Amendment rights.
While law enforcement agents regularly use this arrest tactic when dealing
with protestors,255 the executive’s declaration of an emergency augments
the problem. Once there is an emergency declaration, law enforcement
agents act with flagrant disregard for the constitutional limitations of
arrest. This is evident from the practice of mass arrests and the elevated
volume of arrests after the emergency declaration in my three protest
narratives.
In the Seattle WTO Conference scenario, police arrested protestors
en masse. A large swath of protestors were arrested in a park—within a
no-protest zone ordered by the Seattle mayor. In the case of Menotti v. City
of Seattle, one hundred and seventy-five marchers were surrounded by
police within the no-protest area and when they responded by sitting, they
248. ACLU, OUT OF CONTROL: SEATTLE’S FLAWED RESPONSE TO PROTESTS AGAINST THE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 35 (2000) [hereinafter OUT OF CONTROL].
249. Id. at 36.
250. Id. at 40–41.
251. Id. at 36, 39.
252. Day Two November 30, 1999, THE WTO HISTORY PROJECT, http://depts.washington.edu/
wtohist/day2.htm [https://perma.cc/JCS6-QXVR].
253. OUT OF CONTROL, supra note 248, at 44.
254. See generally id.
255. See WOOD, supra note 18, at 38, 78–79.
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were arrested without any warning and without police having assessed
whether any of the marchers were permitted to be in the zone.256 At an
eventual trial, jurors concluded that the police had violated these arrestees’
Fourth Amendment rights after hearing evidence that the arrestees’ police
reports were fabricated.257 When police reports of these arrests were
compared, they were all found to be identical and false. Instead of writing
an individualized report for each arrest, police simply duplicated one
report from an unassociated arrest that had occurred hours before at a
different location.258
The Menotti case demonstrates the problem endemic with mass
arrests, which shows that these types of arrests are by definition arbitrary
and therefore unreasonable. Under the Fourth Amendment, an arrest is
justified when the court can make a finding that a reasonable person in the
officer’s position—faced with the specific facts and circumstances—
would have probable cause to believe that the arrestee had committed or
was in the process of committing a criminal offense,259 or—in a legal
emergency—refusing to comply with an emergency order. Probable cause
is a particularized assessment with respect to each arrested individual.260
A police officer cannot reasonably make a particularized probable cause
assessment for a mass of people. Prior to the trial, the district judge
presiding over the case granted summary judgment to some of the
plaintiffs on the probable cause question elucidating this point.261 The
judge stated that just like in other circumstances, during protests
“individualized suspicion of wrongdoing is required for probable
cause.”262 The police cannot paint all activists with a broad brush because
they are all engaged in protest activity. The police officers in the Westlake
Park mass arrest could not make the necessary observations regarding each
protestor to determine whether each was engaging in illegal conduct or
behaving in violation of the emergency order. Yet, the pressure to arrest
and to control and suppress the protests created by the emergency
declaration instigated officers to falsify police reports. After all was said
256. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1126, 1147 (9th Cir. 2005); see also Bob Young,
City to Pay $1 Million to Settle Lawsuit Over WTO Arrests, SEATTLE TIMES (Apr. 3, 2007),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/city-to-pay-1-million-to-settle-lawsuit-over-wto-arrests/
[https://perma.cc/UAR5-G6GV].
257. See Young, supra note 256. After the verdict, Seattle settled the lawsuit for $1 million. Id.;
see also OUT OF CONTROL, supra note 248, at 67–68.
258. OUT OF CONTROL, supra note 248, at 67; see also Hickey v. City of Seattle, No. C001672MJP, 2006 WL 3692658, at *2 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 3, 2006).
259. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949).
260. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
261. Hickey, 2006 WL 3692658 at *10.
262. Id. at *7 (citing Barham v. Ramsey, 434 F.3d 565, 573–74 (D.C. Cir. 2006)).
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and done, there were 631 people arrested in four days in Seattle, and in the
overwhelming majority of these arrests individuals were either never
charged or their cases were dismissed.263 Once protestors arrived at the
jail, they were mistreated by jail officials, particularly if they sought to
exercise their right to legal counsel.264 Protestors reported about 300
incidents of excessive force by correctional officers.265 This number of
complaints is unconscionable and demonstrates that these individuals were
targeted during detention for their protest activity.
Likewise, after the gubernatorial emergency in North Dakota, law
enforcement replicated the pattern of mass arrests and abusive post-arrest
treatment—targeting water protectors en masse and then punishing them
with humiliating detention tactics. In two incidents in October,
approximately 250 people were arrested. In the first incident, police
arrested about 130 people as they marched and prayed.266 Five days later,
police used less than lethal military weapons on water protectors and
arrested about 140 people, most of whom had simply been praying.267
Narratives described police advancing with tanks and in riot gear after
attempting to remove people from their encampment.268 Those arrested
reported abusive conditions, including being unnecessarily strip searched
and women being left naked in cells.269 No rationale justifies law
enforcement holding people naked in their cells. This amounts to punitive
pretrial detention conditions that violate the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment. The Due Process Clause forbids punishing an arrestee
who has not yet been convicted of any offense.270 In assessing whether a
263. SEATTLE AFTER ACTION REP., supra note 167, at 48; OUT OF CONTROL, supra note 248, at
68.
264. OUT OF CONTROL, supra note 248, at 69–70. About 300 incidents of excessive force at the
jail were reported by protestors. Id. at 71.
265. Id.
266. First Amended Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and
Declaratory Relief at 11, Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 16-cv-406 (D.N.D. Feb. 27, 2018).
267. Id.
268. Michael McLaughlin, Dakota Access Pipeline Standoff Lapses into Violence, HUFFPOST
(Oct. 28, 2016), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/dakota-access-pipeline-protesters-removed_n_5
8123b0ee4b0990edc2fb009 [https://perma.cc/9ZR9-NJ9J].
269. Loeffelholz Dunn, supra note 136; see also First Amended Civil Rights Class Action
Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 11, Dundon, No. 16-cv-406 (D.N.D.
Feb. 27, 2018); Ben Norton, Dakota Pipeline Protestors Say They Were Detained in Dog Kennels;
268 Arrested in Week of Police Crackdown, SALON (Nov. 1, 2016), https://www.salon.com
/2016/10/31/dakota-pipeline-protesters-say-they-were-detained-in-dog-kennels-268-arrests-in-weekof-police-crackdown/ [https://perma.cc/BZ4T-UP5V]; Daniella Silva, Dakota Access Pipeline: More
Than 100 Arrested as Protestors Ousted From Camp, NBC NEWS (Oct. 27, 2016),
https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/dakota-pipeline-protests/dakota-access-pipeline-authoritiesstart-arresting-protesters-new-camp-n674066/ [https://perma.cc/9A59-KJGA].
270. Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979).
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condition of pretrial detention amounts to a punishment, a court inquires
whether there is an “expressed intent to punish.”271 If there is not, the court
will assess whether the condition is reasonably related to a legitimate
government purpose or whether it “appears excessive . . . arbitrary or
purposeless.”272 Detaining people naked in cells can only fit the latter. The
government could not possibly articulate a “legitimate government
purpose” for humiliating women in this manner. No public or individual
safety rationale justifies this mode of detention. Even when there is
concern for a detainee’s safety such as when someone is considered
suicidal the individual is garbed in special anti-suicide smocks.273 Of
course, there was no allegation that these women were suicidal. Further,
use of this humiliating tactic demonstrates an actual intent to punish.
The Supreme Court has dealt with strip searches from the perspective
of the Fourth Amendment, in addition to due process. The Court has ruled
that a strip search of pretrial detainees does not violate the Fourth
Amendment when conducted to protect against disease, contraband, or
weapons.274 Generally, judicial review is deferential to jail officials
“unless there is ‘substantial evidence’ demonstrating that their response to
the situation is exaggerated.”275 The factual contexts of these strip searches
are unclear. Without more information regarding how, where, and by
whom they were conducted, it is difficult to assess whether arrestees could
demonstrate that these searches were exaggerated under the
circumstances. However, the fact that people were simultaneously held
naked in their cells evidences an intent to punish in violation of due
process and demonstrates that the searches were, therefore, unreasonable
and in violation of the Fourth Amendment. These arrest conditions are
untenable and violate not only detainees’ constitutional rights, but also
human decency. Needless to say, being subjected not only to these
unreasonable and militarized mass arrests but also to humiliating searches
and detention conditions will dissuade most from expressing public
dissent.
The same arbitrary arrest mentality dictated the police strategy in
Ferguson after the gubernatorial emergency declaration. In interactions
with protestors, police made telling assertions, such as stating that “the
constitution did not provide any constitutional right to assemble” and that
271. Id. at 584.
272. Id. at 538–39, 560–61.
273. Juliet Lapidos, What’s an Anti-Suicide Smock? It’s Noose-Proof, SLATE (Dec. 5, 2007),
https://slate.com/news-and-politics/2007/12/how-an-anti-suicide-smock-prevents-prisoners-fromkilling-themselves.html [https://perma.cc/28NJ-JZ23].
274. Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 330–34 (2011).
275. Id. at 330; see also Bell, 441 U.S. at 547–48.

42

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:1

they were advised to “arrest demonstrators and charge them
indiscriminately, even though they were certain that the charges would not
stand.”276 The police felt that people should not be protesting.277 An
analysis of arrest numbers demonstrates a marked increase in the
frequency of arrests after the emergency declaration. The DOJ
investigation estimates that police arrested about 300 people in connection
with the initial Ferguson protests.278
My examination of St. Louis County police arrest records from
August 10th to 21st demonstrate that almost all of these arrests occurred
after the governor’s emergency declaration.279 When looking at arrest
numbers, I counted arrests made in the protest area for certain crimes,
namely refusal to disperse, disorderly conduct, interference with police,
weapon possession, and destruction of property. I limited my investigation
to these types of arrests because I believe that they are most likely to be
connected to the protests. Almost 85% of arrests were for refusal to
disperse. Understanding that these records may not encompass all arrests,
such as when an individual was released before booking or when an
arrestee was booked in another county, the numbers show that police only
made nine relevant arrests in the six days before the emergency
declaration, while they made 142 arrests in the five days after the
declaration.280 Since the emergency continued after August 21st for ten
more days, we can assume that the approximately 150 remaining arrests
occurred during the rest of the emergency period. Thus, there is a
staggering difference in the volume of arrests before versus after the
emergency declaration. This difference—along with police’s admitted
statements—shows that the state of emergency in Missouri animated law
enforcement to engage in arbitrary and voluminous arrests.
D. Restricting Use of Traditional Public Forums
Another pattern discernable from the protest jurisdictions is
controlling of protestors’ expressive activities in public physical spaces.
As previously mentioned, people enjoy the greatest level of First
Amendment freedoms in public streets and parks—otherwise called
traditional public forums.281 In the protest jurisdictions, the executive
276. Complaint at 13, 16, Templeton v. Dotson, No. 4:14-cv-2019, 2015 WL 13650910 (E.D.
Mo. Dec. 8, 2014).
277. Id. at 16.
278. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 38.
279. Ferguson Crisis Arrest Data, Aug. 10–22, 2014 (on file with author).
280. Id.
281. See Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1939); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983).
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limited activists’ access to the streets via protest zones and curfews. While
police do not need an emergency declaration to restrict protesting to
certain areas, law enforcement instituted these protest/free-speech zones
in Ferguson and Seattle after the governor and mayor proclaimed an
emergency.282 The executive can only institute a curfew with a preceding
emergency declaration.
1. Assembly & No-Protest/Speech Zones
When the government restricts protests to a specific area, these areas
are “free-speech zones.” Outside the parameters of the zone, speech and
assembly is foreclosed. These restrictions of demonstrators are justified
during an emergency as tools to keep the peace. From the activist
perspective, these types of free-speech zones minimize the effectiveness
of protests, reducing the volume, expanse, and reach of the message.283
Official statements that emergency directives—which include protest
zones—are meant to protect speakers are not uncommon,284 but the larger
public space then becomes a no-speech, no-dissent zone. The Supreme
Court has not yet ruled on whether the use of protest zones or pens
conforms with the First Amendment. Lower courts have categorized and
evaluated these zones as content-neutral time, place, and manner
restrictions, and thus have applied the test the Supreme Court elucidated
in the Ward v. Rock Against Racism case.285 In Ward, plaintiffs challenged
282. See DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 64; See City of Seattle Resolution 30099 (Dec.
6, 1999) (enacted) https://www.seattle.gov/Documents/Departments/CityArchive/DDL/WTO/1999
Dec6.htm [https://perma.cc/5J4N-D748].
283. See ZICK, supra note 151, at 225; WOOD, supra note 18, at 36.
284. ZICK, supra note 151, at 225; see WOOD, supra note 18, at 36.
285. The analysis in the Supreme Court case Ward v. Rock Against Racism can be applied to the
concept of protest pens. 491 U.S. 781 (1989). Because they are not categorized as viewpoint based
restrictions on speech, spatial constraints receive comparatively less exacting review, and the
government need not employ the least restrictive means to regulate this speech. Id. Instead, according
to Ward, when government alleges a legitimate interest in regulating the time, place and manner of
speech, narrowly tailored restrictions that provide alternative channels for expression will survive the
court’s intermediate scrutiny. Id. at 798. Generally, this spatial regulation has passed judicial muster
among lower courts as being reasonable. ZICK, supra note 151, at 246. Scholars have expressed
concerns that content-neutral restrictions on speech pass judicial review too readily and thus are most
chilling to speech. See Aaron Johnson, Interning Dissent: The Law of Large Political Events, 9 DUKE
J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 87 (2013); see also James J. Knicely & John W. Whitehead, The Caging
of Free Speech in America, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 455, 488 (2005) (discussing court’s
failure to require the government to meet its burden of proof showing that restrictions on speech are
not too great and that alternative avenues are available to protesters); Timothy Zick, Speech and
Spatial Tactics, 84 TEX. L. REV. 581, 587, 631 (2006) [hereinafter Speech and Spatial Tactics].
Critiques of the content-neutral Ward test assert that it is not sufficiently exacting to protect speech.
Critics suggest more discerning review of content neutral spatial limitations on speech is appropriate,
particularly when the government utilizes free-speech zones or pens because such “spatial tactics are

44

Seattle University Law Review

[Vol. 43:1

a New York City ordinance that required bands performing in Central Park
to use City sound equipment and a City sound technician to regulate the
degree of noise.286 Finding that the ordinance was a content neutral time,
place, and manner restriction on the First Amendment rights of musicians,
the Court reasoned that the City alleged a substantial interest in noise
regulation, and that the ordinance survived because it was narrowly
tailored and provided alternative channels for expression.287 First
Amendment experts have criticized the application of the Ward test to
protest zones, suggesting that courts realistically are applying “a weak
strain of rationality review” that is not sufficiently protective and chills
speech.288 Courts are particularly deferential when the government alleges
a security concern.289 Courts can most easily take this view when the
government claims that there is an emergency situation.290 This results in
an increasingly protracted review where the Court will easily justify the
spatial restriction on First Amendment rights. The Ward test is not
appropriate for speech zones—particularly when the protest is the
emergency that the government is protecting against. The Supreme Court
stated in Ward that “[t]he principal inquiry in determining content
neutrality . . . is whether the government has adopted a regulation of
speech because of disagreement with the message it conveys.”291 In the
protest jurisdictions, the restrictions are not comparable to a noise
ordinance. The protest conduct is not distinguishable from the message.
Furthermore, in all the protest jurisdictions, the message is critical of the
government—thus unlike messages targeted by neutral noise ordinances.
More exacting review is warranted than a weak brand of content-neutral
analysis.

neutering political dissent.” See Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra, at 587, 631; see also ZICK, supra
note 151, at 225; James J. Knicely & John W. Whitehead, The Caging of Free Speech in America, 14
TEM. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 455, 481–90 (2005). Although courts in their application of Ward
theoretically utilize intermediate scrutiny to assess these protest zones, First Amendment experts
quarrel that the court’s test really amounts to “a weak strain of rationality review.” Speech and Spatial
Tactics, supra, at 583.
286. Ward, 491 U.S. at 784 (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non–Violence, 468 U.S.
288, 295 (1984)).
287. Id. at 798.
288. Speech and Spatial Tactics, supra note 285, at 583.
289. See id. at 641; ZICK, supra note 151, at 246; see also Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d
1113, 1126 (9th Cir. 2005).
290. See Menotti, 409 F.3d at 1113; Hickey v. City of Seattle, 236 F.R.D. 659, 659 (W.D. Wash.
2006).
291. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791.
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In both Ferguson and Seattle, there is no question that the
government regulated the use of public city streets.292 Police enforced
these regulations with less than lethal weapons, aggression, and arrests—
as discussed in the preceding section. In Seattle, the mayor instituted a
protest zone through an emergency order.293 While the Seattle mayor’s
statement termed the restriction a “curfew,” the restriction essentially
amounted to a zoning which prohibited civilians—with exceptions for
WTO delegates and area residents and business owners—from entering
downtown Seattle during the conference.294 Litigants in Menotti v. City of
Seattle filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of all those arrested due to the
no-protest zone and thereafter not convicted.295 As expected, the Ninth
Circuit applied the content-neutral Ward analysis. In response to the facial
First Amendment challenge, the court found that the restriction was
content neutral because it did not limit a particular type or content of
speech—but instead limited the place where speech was permitted.296 Of
course, those protesting in the zone would necessarily be protesting the
WTO.
On whether the restriction was narrowly tailored, the court ultimately
answered by refusing to “inject [itself] into the methods of policing.”297
This was despite the WTO no-protest zone covering a twenty-five block
radius of Seattle streets.298 The Menotti opinion evidences the court’s
fear—as it focused the discussion on violent protestors, despite
recognizing that the overwhelming majority were lawful and peaceful.299
The court then concluded that there were ample alternative areas to protest,
despite the large no-protest zone300—again citing violence and “dire
facts.”301 Thus, the court found that the curfew was a facially valid time,
place, and manner restriction.302 Menotti did find that a First Amendment
as applied challenge was appropriate and should proceed to trial, as well

292. The public at large is meant to enjoy the greatest ability to express itself on its city streets
because they are a traditional public forum. ERIC BARENDT, FREEDOM OF SPEECH 276 (2d ed. 2005);
ZICK, supra note 151, at 55–56.
293. See Seattle Emergency Proclamation, supra note 71, at Exhibit D.
294. Id.; see also SEATTLE CITY COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 131, at 15.
295. See Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1126 (9th Cir. 2005).
296. Id. at 1129.
297. Id. at 1137.
298. Id. at 1358 (Paez, J., concurring and dissenting).
299. Id. at 1120, 1132.
300. Id. at 1358 (Paez, J., concurring and dissenting).
301. Id. at 1140–42.
302. Id. at 1143.
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as a Fourth Amendment challenge for unreasonable arrests and seizures.303
Ultimately, at trial a jury found that police violated activists’ Fourth
Amendment rights, but not their First Amendment rights to free speech.304
Even without the jury finding a First Amendment violation, the jury’s
verdict on the Fourth Amendment issue signals constitutional concerns
associated with the use of no-protest zones. After the verdict, Seattle
eventually settled by paying $1 million to 175 arrested protestors and
clearing their criminal records.305
As seen by the Menotti opinion, facial challenges to protest zones
easily survive court scrutiny because they are evaluated as content-neutral
restrictions. As applied First Amendment violations are difficult to prove
because plaintiffs must demonstrate to a jury that chilling protected speech
“was a substantial or motivating factor in the defendant’s conduct.”306 This
element is challenging for plaintiffs because it requires the jury to assess
not only a police officer’s subjective intent, but specifically whether
chilling the plaintiff’s expression was the motivating and/or substantial
objective. Reading the police officers’ personal motives might feel
impossible for jurors. Fourth Amendment violations present a less
insurmountable challenge, since jurors are asked to assess whether the
seizure was reasonable under the circumstances307—not whether the police
officer’s subjective intent was reasonable.
Three days after the Missouri emergency declaration, the highway
patrol—which the governor placed in command via executive order—
restricted protests to a specific zone.308 Protestors were displaced from the
locations that they had selected to gather and communicate with the
media.309 Protestors complained that this alternative site was not relevant
to their protest and not accessible to the media zone.310 The protest zone
in Ferguson was not challenged, despite activists’ concerns—perhaps due
303. The Ninth Circuit did not dismiss the plaintiffs’ as applied First Amendment challenges to
the curfew, finding persuasive plaintiffs’ accounts that individuals exempt from the curfew were not
permitted into the protest zone unless they removed anti-WTO paraphernalia and instead remanded
the case for trial on those issues. Id. at 1148. Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court
had improperly dismissed the Fourth Amendment challenge finding a genuine issue of material fact
existed as to whether the police had probable cause to arrest the plaintiff, thus reversing the district
court and remanding that issue for trial. Id. at 1150.
304. See Young, supra note 256.
305. See id.
306. NINTH CIRCUIT JURY INSTRUCTIONS COMM., MANUAL OF MODEL CIVIL JURY
INSTRUCTIONS § 9.11 (2017).
307. Id. at § 9.20.
308. See DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 64 n.212.
309. AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 9.
310. Id.; see also Abdullah v. County of Saint Louis, 52 F. Supp. 3d 936, 941–42 (E.D. Mo.
2014).
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to the ease of overcoming judicial review. In North Dakota, the U.S. Corps
of Engineers eventually established a “free-speech zone” far from pipeline
construction.311 Within the week, the North Dakota Governor ordered the
evacuation of the relevant area.312
2. Curfews
Governors and mayors often set curfews pursuant to an emergency
declaration.313 An emergency declaration is a necessary antecedent to a
curfew.314 Missouri Revised Statute section 44.100 and North Dakota
Central Code section 37.17.1-05, both listing the governor’s emergency
power, do not explicitly mention curfews.315 However, the North Dakota
law states that the governor can “control ingress and egress in
a[n] . . . emergency area, the movement of persons within the area . . . .”316
Less specifically, the Missouri law states that the governor can direct law
enforcement to “secur[e] compliance” with emergency orders.317 Further,
both these statutes have broad, catch-all provisions.318 Seattle Municipal
Code section 10.02.020 explicitly states that in an emergency, the mayor
can order a curfew.319
Without an emergency declaration, the executive cannot impose a
curfew that does not at least provide an exception for First Amendment
activity. The existence of an emergency declaration determines whether a
311. Press Release, Stand with Standing Rock, Army Corp Closes Public Access to Oceti
Sakowin Camp on Dec. 5th (Nov. 26, 2016) https://standwithstandingrock.net/army-corp-closespublic-access-oceti-sakowin-camp-dec-5th/ [https://perma.cc/JC8Z-MH58].
312. N.D. Exec. Order 2016-08, supra note 40.
313. See Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105 (11th Cir. 1996) (upholding a curfew imposed after
hurricane Andrew), abrogated on other grounds by Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment,
523 U.S. 83 (1998); Moorhead v. Farrelly, 727 F. Supp. 193 (V.I. 1989) (affirming the constitutionality
of a curfew imposed after Hurricane Hugo); U.S. v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277 (4th Cir. 1971) (finding
constitutional an Ashville curfew in response to fight between African American students and police);
ACLU of W. Tenn., Inc. v. Chandler, 458 F. Supp. 456 (W.D. Tenn. 1978) (upholding Tennessee
curfew in response to police strike); In re Juan C., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 919 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
the imposed during the Los Angeles Riots was not unconstitutionally overbroad and did not encourage
arbitrary enforcement).
314. See Glenn C. Frese, The Riot Curfew, 57 CAL. L. REV. 450, 457 (1969); Jeffrey F. Ghent,
Validity and Construction of Curfew Statute, Ordinance, or Proclamation, 59 A.L.R.3D 321, Section
2-a, 3-a (1974).
315. See MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100 (2008); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05 (2013).
316. N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05(6)(g) (2013).
317. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100.1(3)(b) (2008).
318. Id. at § 44.100.1(3)(j) (“The emergency powers of the governor shall be as follows: . . .
Perform and exercise such other functions, powers and duties as may be necessary to promote and
secure the safety and protection of the civilian population.”); N.D. CENT. CODE § 37-17.1-05(6)
(2013) (enumerating numerous powers of the governor during an emergency under the title, “In
addition to any other powers conferred upon the governor by law . . .”).
319. SEATTLE, WASH., MUNICIPAL CODE § 10.02.020(A)(1) (1992) (prior to amendments).
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court will—without a First Amendment exception—find the curfew to be
an unconstitutional restriction on individuals’ rights. Courts have upheld
curfews that are enacted during a legal emergency.320 General curfews
impact the rights of speech and assembly. They generally preclude all
types of public activity during a portion of the day—including protest.
Courts apply a particularly yielding reasonableness test when evaluating
an “emergency” curfew. For emergency curfews, judges inquire only
whether the curfew was enacted in good faith and whether a factual basis
exists for the decision that such action was necessary to maintain order.321
As I will discuss in the next Part of this Article, this is the same yielding
standard that courts apply when assessing the propriety of the emergency
declaration.322 In the emergency curfew cases, the courts compare the
government’s asserted interest in public safety with the freedom interests
of individuals.323 The government always wins when it alleges a threat to
life and property that warrants an emergency declaration.324 Particularly
with nighttime curfews, courts dismiss concerns by highlighting dangers
associated with the evening hours of an emergency and by reasoning that
individuals retain access to the streets for protest or other activities during
day time.325 But courts also do not scrutinize an executive’s emergency
declaration.326 This, coupled with minimal judicial review of both the state
of emergency and the resulting curfew, means the legal emergency
abridges First Amendment rights via a curfew that would not be permitted
320. See, e.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (upholding a curfew from 8:00
p.m. to 6:00 a.m. imposed on German and Italian noncitizens, and Japanese noncizens and citizens
during World War II); Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 109 (11th Cir. 1996) (“when a curfew is imposed
as an emergency measure in response to a natural disaster, the scope of review in cases challenging its
constitutionality ‘is limited to a determination whether the [executive’s] actions were taken in good
faith and whether there is some factual basis for the decision that the restrictions . . . imposed were
necessary to maintain order.’”).
321. See Smith, 91 F.3d at 109 (11th Cir. 1996); United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1282
(4th Cir. 1971); Moorhead v. Farrelly, 727 F. Supp. 193, 200 (V.I. 1989).
322. See infra Part IV(b).
323. Chalk, 441 F.2d at 1280–81.
324. See In re Juan C., 33 Cal. Rptr. 2d 919, 922 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); see also Chalk, 441 F.2d
at 1280.
325. See ACLU of W. Tenn. v. Chandler, 458 F. Supp. 456, 461–62 (W.D. Tenn. 1978) (“There
can be no doubt that plaintiffs will suffer a limitation on the exercise of their first amendment rights
as long as the curfew remains in effect. . . . However, it must be remembered that plaintiffs are free to
exercise these rights during other hours of the day, and that the curfew is an emergency measure which
hopefully will not long remain in effect.”); Moorhead, 727 F. Supp. at 201 (“The hours during which
the curfew will remain in effect are among those least likely to interfere with the exercise of first
amendment rights, and simultaneously close to if not identical to the hours when the threat of crime
and violence are at their highest: the hours when most people are asleep, and when night is at its
darkest.”).
326. See infra Part IV(b).
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without the executive declaration. The court’s calculus of balancing the
government’s asserted safety interest with individual rights is not
sufficiently protective of the First Amendment when the protest is the
emergency. This is because, while the curfew forbids every person from
being on the streets, the executive institutes it in response to mass
protests—not a natural or other disaster. Thus, it is difficult to argue that
it is not targeted to stop the protests. However, because of the emergency
lens, courts apply a lenient reasonableness and good faith standard to the
curfew.
Without an emergency declaration, courts seriously consider the
First Amendment implications of curfews.327 Curfews are considered time,
place, and manner restrictions; and courts will invalidate them when there
is no “clear and present danger”328 or a First Amendment exception. This
is because a curfew is an “all-encompassing restriction . . . . [It]
significantly restricts expression in all forums for [a significant portion] of
[the] day.”329 From this perspective, the courts’ content-neutral time,
place, and manner review has more bite than in the previously discussed
no-protest zones. Using this analysis, courts have found that juvenile
curfews without robust First Amendment exceptions are not narrowly
tailored; therefore, they are unconstitutional.330 Emergency curfews
cannot have First Amendment exceptions, particularly when the protest is
the emergency. It is the emergency declarations that condone and justify
this “all-encompassing restriction” on speech.
In Ferguson, the governor instituted a curfew from midnight to five
in the morning in his initial executive order declaring the emergency.331
327. See, e.g., Hodgkins ex rel. Hodgkins v. Peterson, 355 F.3d 1048 (7th Cir. 2004);
Commonwealth v. Weston W., 913 N.E.2d 832, 842–43 (Mass. 2009).
328. See State v. Dobbins, 178 S.E.2d 449, 458 (N.C. 1978) (upholding a curfew in the City of
Asheville after a mayoral emergency declaration); see also Chandler, 458 F. Supp. at 456; State v.
Boles, 240 A.2d 920 (Conn. Cir. Ct. 1967); Judicial Control of the Riot Curfew, 77 YALE L.J. 1560
(1968).
329. Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 950 (9th Cir. 1997).
330. Id. at 949–51; see also Hodgkins, 355 F.3d at 1048. Contra Hutchins v. District of
Columbia, 188 F.3d 531, 535, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding that an exception for “exercising First
Amendment rights, including free exercise of religion, freedom of speech and right of assembly” was
not vague and the curfew was constitutional); Schleifer v. City of Charlottesville, 159 F.3d 843, 853–
54 (4th Cir. 1998) (finding that a juvenile nighttime curfew containing a First Amendment exception
was not unconstitutionally vague).
331. Mo. Exec. Order 14-08, supra note 7; see also Julie Bosman & Alan Blinder, Midnight
Curfew in Effect for Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com
/2014/08/17/us/ferguson-missouri-protests.html [https://perma.cc/P4HT-C2TA] (reporting that the
curfew lasted for two days); Julian Kimble, Missouri Governor Ends Curfew in Ferguson, COMPLEX
(Aug. 18, 2014), http://www.complex.com/pop-culture/2014/08/missouri-governor-ends-curfew-inferguson [https://perma.cc/2VZT-3HK6].
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Contrary to the promise that the curfew would not be “enforce[d] with
trucks . . . [or] with tear gas, [but with] communication,”332 law
enforcement traveling in armored vehicles used tear gas on
demonstrators.333 On the first night of the curfew, police shot one African
American teenager and arrested others.334 In their Statement on the
Ferguson Curfew, civil rights groups asserted infringements on protestors’
First Amendment rights and declared that the curfew essentially amounted
to “a lockdown on the residents of Ferguson.”335 From its inception, civil
rights groups complained that the Ferguson curfew suppressed speech.336
Despite these complaints, the curfew was not challenged in court. This
may be due to courts’ deferential review.
E. Ad Hoc Emergency Rules and Practices
In my protest narratives, government officials enforced a series of ad
hoc rules, prompted by the proclaimed emergency, that created fear and
suppressed First Amendment activity.
In Ferguson, police commanders under the supervision of the
Missouri State Highway Patrol—the police agency designated by the
Governor as incident commander337—instituted a “keep moving”
strategy.338 During a legal emergency, any orders by the governor or his
designated incident commander become the law of the land.339
Noncompliance with those rules was an arrestable offense.340 This rule
required protestors to keep moving when outside the protest zone or be
arrested for failure to disperse,341 despite the fact that this conduct did not
warrant an arrest for that crime.342 The state’s failure to disperse crime
instead required that an individual fail to obey a lawful command while

332. Bosman & Blinder, supra note 331.
333. More Violence, Unrest in Ferguson, CBS NEWS (Aug. 17, 2014), http://www.
cbsnews.com/news/ferguson-protest-broken-up-after-curfew/ [https://perma.cc/7DEW-EGBW].
334. Id.
335. ACLU, LAWYER’S COMM. FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, LEGAL DEF. & EDUC. FUND, JOINT
STATEMENT ON FERGUSON, MO CURFEW, https://www.aclu.org/other/joint-statement-ferguson-mocurfew [https://perma.cc/8CLL-9N3R].
336. Id.
337. Mo. Exec. Order 14-08, supra note 7.
338. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 25.
339. See MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100.1(3)(b) (2008).
340. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.130(2) (“Any person violating any rule or regulation adopted under
this law after it has become effective during an emergency or any person or officer violating any
provision of this law shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor.”).
341. AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 7; Abdullah v. County of Saint Louis, 52
F. Supp. 3d 936, 944 (E.D. Mo. 2014).
342. MO. REV. STAT. § 574.060 (2017).
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being present at a riot or an unlawful assembly.343 Police were not told to
assess whether protestors were somehow engaged in either rioting or
unlawful assembly. Police were informed of the keep moving strategy
during roll call, but they were provided no guidance regarding how and
under what circumstances it should apply.344 Officers were just instructed
“to use their discretion.”345 The police applied the policy in myriad ways,
including ordering people not to stand still for more than five seconds, to
continue to move at a particular speed, etc.346 Some officers only applied
the keep moving policy to those outside the protest zone, while others
applied it within, and there were also inconsistencies about whether the
rule applied to the press.347 Activists believed that the purpose of the keep
moving rule was to exhaust protestors.348
The same day that the keep moving rule was enacted and enforced
by police, plaintiff filed a civil complaint in Abdullah v. County of St.
Louis and sought to enjoin the practice.349 The complaint asserted that the
ad hoc rule violated the First Amendment and due process.350 At the initial
hearing, the judge applied the time, place, and manner test and denied
plaintiff’s first request for a temporary restraining order that the practice
cease immediately.351 The court was convinced by the government’s
contention that, while the keep moving practice was in effect, there was
an alternative designated protest zone.352 The plaintiff then returned to the
streets of Ferguson. Despite his inability to locate the zone that day, he
was again forced to keep moving.353 Law enforcement utilized this keep
moving strategy, albeit inconsistently, for five days.354 Using the Ward test
for content-neutral restrictions, the court eventually decided that the
plaintiff would likely succeed in a First Amendment challenge to the
strategy that did not permit him to either engage in conversation with
others on the sidewalk or peacefully assemble.355 The court ruled that the
343. Id.; see also AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 12.
344. Abdullah, 52 F. Supp. at 941.
345. Id. at 943.
346. Id. at 942.
347. Id. at 946.
348. AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 7.
349. See Verified Complaint at 2, Abdullah, 52 F. Supp. 3d 936 (No. 4:14-cv-1436).
350. Id. at 5–6.
351. Abdullah, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 941.
352. Id.
353. Id. The DOJ After Assessment Report of Ferguson confirms that a protest zone was not
established until the day after police enacted the keep moving strategy. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra
note 5, at 63–64 n.212.
354. Abdullah, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 941–42 (finding police unified command used this strategy
from August 18, 2014 to August 23, 2014).
355. Id. at 946–47.
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keep moving strategy was not narrowly tailored, but instead was a blanket
rule applied too broadly to protect the government’s asserted interest to
prevent violence.356 The court further concluded that even if the keep
moving restriction could be justified there was likely no adequate alternate
forum since the establishment of a protest zone was delayed.357
The court also agreed with the plaintiff that the keep moving strategy
likely violated due process and the Fourth Amendment.358 Due process
principles require that when a government rule affects First Amendment
rights, the rule must provide a “greater degree of specificity” or be void
for vagueness.359 This is because a rule is unconstitutionally vague when
it does not give notice of what conduct is prohibited so individuals may
regulate their behavior; further, this vagueness also promotes arbitrary
application by law enforcement.360 The court found that the tactic both
gave insufficient notice to civilians regarding what conduct was prohibited
and provided the police with too much discretion.361 The court agreed with
the plaintiff’s allegation that this broad police discretion “authorize[d] and
encourage[d] arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”362 A community
member confirmed this, stating: “The five-second rule only applied to
those people that police wanted it to apply to.”363 Consistent with my
arguments in the prior section, I believe the Ward time, place, and manner
test is not sufficiently protective of First Amendment rights when the
protest is the chaos that law enforcement is attempting to quash. This is
even more so in Ferguson, where the message was intimately connected
to the expression and was critical of the same police who instituted and
enforced the keep moving tactic.364 Furthermore, although this was not an
argument made by the plaintiff in the suit, failure to disperse arrests
resulting from enforcement of the unlawful keep moving strategy were not
supported by probable cause, since the police did not engage in any
determination regarding the main element of the crime—the existence of
356. Id. at 947.
357. Id. at 946–47.
358. Id. at 946.
359. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968) (“[G]overnment regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an
important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the
suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”).
360. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 5.02 (7th ed. 2015).
361. Abdullah, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 943.
362. Verified Complaint at 6, Abdullah, 52 F. Supp. 3d 936 (No. 4:14-cv-1436); see also
Abdullah, 52 F. Supp. 3d at 943.
363. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 62.
364. See supra Section I(B) (describing the subject matter of the Ferguson protests).
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a riot or an unlawful assembly. Thus, the strategy also violated the Fourth
Amendment.
Police officers adopted the ad hoc practice of not wearing or covering
name tags and badges in both Seattle and Ferguson.365 This practice was
contrary to the policies of their police departments.366 Across law
enforcement, police officers must be readily identifiable.367 This is
because an anonymous militarized police force is dangerous. Anonymity
is inconsistent with accountability and breeds violence.368 Civilians can
hold officers personally accountable for their unlawful or violent actions
via complaint procedures or lawsuits. Nameless police officers can instead
act with personal “impunity.”369 During the WTO protests, police wore
riot gear that did not identify officers and covered their badges,370 turning
them into nameless warriors. Police also covered their badges with rain
gear or even removed or altered their badges.371 Some police went as far
as wearing ski masks.372 In Ferguson, police also removed any identifying
information.373 The Deputy Chief of the DOJ Civil Rights Division wrote
a letter to the Ferguson Police Chief demanding that law enforcement stop
this practice and stating that the Department received “numerous
complaints” about such conduct demonstrating that it was “not
aberrational.”374 When civilians asked anonymous officers for their names
in Ferguson or Seattle, they refused to identify themselves.375 Besides
providing police with a sense of immunity for misconduct, a militarized,
aggressive, and anonymous high police presence is understandably
365. OUT OF CONTROL, supra note 248, at 63–66; Letter from Christy E. Lopez, Deputy Chief,
Special Litigation Section, Civil Rights Div., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to Chief Thomas Jackson, Police
Chief, City of Ferguson (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/crt/legacy
/2014/11/04/ferguson_ltr_nameplates_9-23-14.pdf [https://perma.cc/F2AA-QR4M] [hereinafter DOJ
Letter]; DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 78–79; AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1,
at 18–19.
366. The Ferguson Police Department’s General Order 214.00, Uniforms, Equipment and
Appearance, requires that police wear visible identification in uniform and that supervisors ensure
compliance with the uniform policy. DOJ Letter, supra note 365. Likewise, the Seattle Police
Department Manual requires that officers also wear identification and provide their name and badge
information upon inquiry. OUT OF CONTROL, supra note 248, at 64.
367. DOJ Letter, supra note 365.
368. OUT OF CONTROL, supra note 248, at 63; DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 78.
369. DOJ Letter, supra note 365, at 1.
370. OUT OF CONTROL, supra note 248, at 63. Officers removed their names from the back of
their riot helmets. Id. at 64.
371. Id. at 63.
372. Id. at 64.
373. AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 18; DOJ Letter, supra note 365.
374. DOJ Letter, supra note 365.
375. OUT OF CONTROL, supra note 248, at 63; AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1,
at 18.
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intimidating for protestors. Such intimidation chills activists’ willingness
to confront this police force and engage in protest.
Ad hoc practices by judges and government lawyers in Seattle also
were conducive to the suppression of protestors’ rights. After police swept
up individuals in massive and arbitrary arrests on the streets of Seattle,
protestors could not escape jail unless they agreed to stay away from the
WTO area—thus impeding further their right to protest. Prosecutors
conditioned protestors’ release on their agreement to stay out of downtown
Seattle.376 Those who did not agree to the downtown restriction were not
released.377 In one particularly egregious case, a woman was only released
after she agreed to refrain from protesting anywhere in the U.S. for two
years.378 These preconditions to release amount to violations of traditional
bail principles. “[T]he ‘general rule’ of substantive due process [is] that
the government may not detain a person prior to a judgment of guilt in a
criminal trial.”379 Furthermore, the Supreme Court has interpreted the
Eighth Amendment guarantee against excessive bail to mean that the main
objective in imposing pretrial detention is assuring the accused’s return to
court to face the criminal matter.380 When the judge at arraignment is
making this determination, the judge must consider factors that are
relevant to flight.381 These factors are codified in the federal bail statute
and include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense charged, including
whether the offense is a crime of violence . . . ; (2) the weight of the
evidence against the person; (3) the history and characteristics of the
person . . . ; and (4) the nature and the seriousness of the danger to
any person or the community that would be posed by . . . release.382

The Court has also held that it does not violate the Eighth
Amendment and Due Process to detain someone pretrial when the accused
is charged with a dangerous crime, and the judge finds by clear and
convincing evidence that no combination of release conditions could
assure community safety.383 State criminal bail statutes and rules
essentially capture the same principles as their federal counterparts.384 As
376. OUT OF CONTROL, supra note 248, at 68.
377. Id.
378. Id.
379. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 749 (1987).
380. Id. at 753.
381. Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 8 (1965).
382. 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2008).
383. See Salerno, 481 U.S. at 739.
384. See WASH. SUP. CT. R. CRIM. CT. 3.2. The rule states that a defendant charged with a
noncapital offense “shall . . . be ordered released on the accused’s personal recognizance pending
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a matter of fact, the Washington State Constitution guarantees no
excessive bail and that “[a]ll persons charged with crimes shall be bailable
by sufficient sureties,” unless charged with a capital offense.385 None of
these well-established bail principles justify protestors being held in jail
simply for refusing to agree to stay away from the WTO area. There is no
connection between that condition and posing a flight risk or danger to the
community. It is inconsistent with the Eighth Amendment and Due
Process principles for the government to impose this restriction as a
precondition to release, and it demonstrates how prosecutors and judges
were complicit in the suppression of protests in Seattle. Although not one
of my target narratives, after the Maryland Governor declared an
emergency in Baltimore in response to mass protests and outcry because
of the death of Freddie Gray—an African American man—while in police
custody, prosecutors used an analogous tactic: keeping arrested protestors
detained for over forty-eight hours without access to a hearing.386 This
practice was in direct contravention of Maryland Rule 4-212(e) requiring
arrested individuals to be brought for bail determination before a judicial
officer within twenty-four hours of arrest.387
F. Conclusion
As demonstrated by the WTO, Ferguson, and pipeline protests in
North Dakota, the threat to constitutional liberties is serious when state
and local governments utilize emergency management mechanisms and
tools to respond to perceived crises. The threat increases when the
executive proclaims a legal emergency because it incites law enforcement
to amplify their use of existing policing tactics and expands the arsenal of
oppressive tools that the government can use to suppress protests.
Executive interests are not aligned with the protection of individual
liberties but with maintaining public order and guarding public safety.
Therefore, state and local authorities taxed with emergency management
duties are currently not well equipped to safeguard the rights of protestors,
members of the community, and the press. Further, current legislative and
judicial mechanisms provide no adequate check on government’s
emergency actions when the protest is the crisis.

trial.” Id. When considering whether the government has overcome the presumption of release on
personal recognizance, the judge will balance factors similar to those in the federal bail statute. See id.
385. WASH. CONST. art. I, §§ 14, 20.
386. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus & Application for Temporary Restraining Order &
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4, Carrie v. Scruggs, No. 24H15000166 (Cir. Ct. for Balt. City
Apr. 29, 2015); see also Md. Exec. Order 01.01.2015.14 (Apr. 27, 2015).
387. Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus & Application for Temporary Restraining Order &
Motion for Preliminary Injunction at 4, Carrie, No. 24H15000166; see also MD. R. CRIM. § 4-212(e).
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IV. CHECKS ON THE EXECUTIVE’S EMERGENCY POWER IN RESPONSE TO
PROTEST
A. Legislative Check is Not Enough
Some may look towards legislatures to manage executive emergency
action. State legislatures often possess some authority regarding
emergency declarations. Missouri is unlike most states in that the
legislature can initiate an emergency.388 This is unusual.389 Legislatures
may have more authority over how the emergency ends. In about half of
the states, either the governor or the legislature can end the emergency.390
Whether a state legislature will realistically act to terminate a
gubernatorial emergency is a separate issue. In addition, legislative
consent or approval may also be required to extend the gubernatoriallydeclared emergency beyond some initially circumscribed amount of
time.391 At the municipal level, city councils or commissions can play a
role in a local emergency declaration.392
Even when legislatures can theoretically limit the power of the
governor to declare a state of emergency, they do not realistically serve as
a check on the governor’s actions. The state legislature may abdicate the
decision to terminate a state of emergency.393 This may be due to
legislators’ sensitivity to the governor’s position as commander in chief,
lawmakers’ fears of taking ownership and responsibility for an emergency
declaration and its consequences, or legislators’ inability to reach a
consensus quickly enough to respond to existing exigencies. Legislators
may also feel that they are at an information deficit compared to the
388. MO. REV. STAT. § 44.100.1(1) (2008).
389. A review of state emergency laws reveals that in addition to Missouri, the state legislatures
of Alabama, Nevada, New Hampshire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, and West Virginia can proclaim
an emergency. See KEITH BEA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., ALABAMA EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AND
HOMELAND SECURITY STATUTORY AUTHORITIES SUMMARIZED, at CRS-3 (2004); MO. CRS REPORT,
supra note 108, at CRS-3; NEV. CRS REPORT, supra note 108, at CRS-3; N.H. CRS REPORT, supra
note 108, at CRS-3; N.C. CRS REPORT, supra note 108, at CRS-3; OKLA. CRS REPORT, supra note
108, at CRS-3; W. VA. CRS REPORT, supra note 108, at CRS-3. But the remaining state legislatures
do not have this power.
390. See authorities cited supra note 108.
391. In Kansas, Michigan, Utah, and Wisconsin, the governor may declare a state of emergency
for a limited period of time, but thereafter the declaration may only be extended when approved by
legislators. See KAN. CRS REPORT, supra note 109, at CRS-3; MICH. CRS REPORT, supra note 109,
at CRS-3; UTAH CRS REPORT, supra note 109, at CRS-2; WIS. CRS REPORT, supra note 109, at CRS3.
392. See Interviews, supra note 21.
393. See, e.g., Robert A. Zarnoch, Gubernatorial Executive Orders: Legislative or Executive
Powers, 44 MD. B.J. 48, 52 (2011) (explaining that while the Maryland legislature has the ability to
change or supersede an executive order, “[t]his rarely occurs”).
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executive, whose law enforcement is closer to the developing crisis. They
may feel ill-equipped to assess the situation.
The efficacy of lawmakers’ restraint on the President during a
national emergency is relevant since the relationship is mirrored at the
state level. When dealing with the executive’s power during a national
emergency, some have proposed that the executive be permitted to
unilaterally act only subject to approval by the legislature within a
prescribed brief period of time.394 However, others have evaluated the
legislature’s actions at times of crisis and concluded that the legislature is
“unlikely to be a guardian of civil liberties.”395 State legislatures’ records
confirm the latter conclusion, as they do not serve as restraints on the state
or local executives during emergencies.396 This may be particularly the
394. Ackerman, supra note 15, at 1047. Professor Ackerman’s proposal includes a concept that
he terms the “supermajoritarian escalator,” which means that the percentage of legislators that would
have to cast an approval vote for the emergency to continue increases as the duration of the emergency
extends. Id. at 1047–50.
395. David Cole, Judging the Next Emergency: Judicial Review and Individual Rights in Times
of Crisis, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2565, 2591 (2003). Professor Cole recounts laws passed during times of
crisis by Congress which have been criticized as offensive to civil liberties. Id. at 2591–92; see also
David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency Constitution’s Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753,
1761–68 (2004).
396. Even in states where the legislature has the authority to declare or terminate a state of
emergency, the governor himself routinely acts unilaterally in proclaiming and ending the emergency.
Numerous states’ responses to civil strife within their jurisdiction are probative of this trend of
legislative passivity. The state of emergency instituted in Baltimore in response to the city’s 2015
protests prompted by the police-involved death of Freddie Gray was both enacted and rescinded by
Maryland Governor Larry Hogan. See Krishnadev Calamur, Maryland Governor Lifts State of
Emergency in Baltimore, NPR (May 6, 2015), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/
2015/05/06/404675117/maryland-governor-lifts-state-of-emergency-in-baltimore
[https://perma.
cc/L66Y-ML5M]; Emily Shapiro, National Guard Troops Deployed After Violent Clashes in
Baltimore, ABC NEWS (Apr. 27, 2015), https://abcnews.go.com/US/hundreds-people-clash-policebaltimore-mall/story?id=30622868 [https://perma.cc/QD9E-YZT9]. The legislature played no role in
either declaration, despite it having the statutory power to terminate the state of emergency at any
time. CRS REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 16. The response has been similar in the other states where
the legislature is statutorily authorized to terminate an active state of emergency. In Wisconsin, the
state of emergency declared in Milwaukee in response to 2016 protests spurred by a police shooting
of an African American driver was declared unilaterally by then-Governor Scott Walker, and it expired
naturally, without legislative involvement. Wis. Exec. Order 209 (Aug. 16, 2015); Shibani Mahtani &
Scott Calvert, Governor Declares State of Emergency in Milwaukee After Shooting, Unrest, WALL
STREET J. (Aug. 15, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/violence-erupts-in-milwaukee-after-fatalshooting-by-police-1471157651 [https://perma.cc/MG56-RYE3]. In 2017, the state legislature had no
involvement in the termination of a state of emergency issued by Florida’s then-Governor, Rick Scott,
in preparation for a white supremacist’s speech at the University of Florida. As drafted, the state of
emergency expired naturally within seven days, unless extended. Fla. Exec. Order No.17-264 (Oct.
16, 2017). In North Carolina—a state in which the legislature has the power to both declare and
terminate a state of emergency—the legislature has similarly remained uninvolved in instituting and
rescinding/revoking such proclamations. In response to the 2016 Charlotte protests against the police
killing of African American Keith Scott, the Governor declared a state of emergency without
legislative involvement. Matthew Teague, Charlotte Protests: Governor of North Carolina Declares
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case when it is the liberties of minority communities that are at stake—
like in Ferguson and the pipeline protests—because lawmakers are not
representative of those communities and thus are unlikely to defend or be
accountable to their interests.397 After Ferguson, observers highlighted the
lack of African American representation in local government.398 The same
was true for state governments in Missouri and North Dakota. Data from
2015 shows that in Missouri and North Dakota about 86% of state
legislators identified as white.399 For these reasons, community members
and protestors cannot rely on state lawmakers to protect their
constitutional rights during an emergency declaration. Also, as previously
discussed, most emergency management strategies do not need a
preceding emergency declaration to go into effect.400 Emergency
management mechanisms offer first responders latitude to act when they
perceive an event as a crisis.401 Thus, even before the executive declares
an emergency, the problematic practices I have discussed will begin to
materialize.
B. The Judiciary has Insufficient Ability to Provide a Check on State and
Local Emergency Management Action
A state of emergency declaration is not immune from judicial review.
However, review of an executive emergency declaration is highly
State of Emergency, GUARDIAN (Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2016/sep/22/charlotte-protests-north-carolina-governor-declares-state-of-emergency
[https://perma.cc/QSL3-SJZG]. In the other six states where the legislature is statutorily authorized to
declare a State of Emergency, the legislatures have similarly taken no action. Besides Missouri and
North Carolina, none of these six states has experienced mass protests leading to an emergency
declaration in the last several years. However, based on the prevalence of governor-declared weatherrelated states of emergency in these states, one can hypothesize that any state of emergency declared
in relation to protests would similarly be issued by the executive. See, e.g., States of Emergency,
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR, STATE OF ALABAMA, https://governor.alabama.gov/newsroom/state-ofemergency/ [https://perma.cc/2XQ7-48HL] (archiving the copious states of emergency the governor
has instituted).
397. See Amber Phillips, The Striking Lack of Diversity in State Legislatures, WASH. POST (Jan.
26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/01/26/the-real-problem-withdiversifying-congress-state-legislatures-are-even-less-diverse/?noredirect=on&utm_term=
.3da75a234077 [https://perma.cc/QLU6-CD9X]; Karl Kurtz, Who We Elect: The Demographics of
State Legislatures, NCSL (Dec. 1, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/about-state-legislatures/whowe-elect.aspx [https://perma.cc/4TAY-KX8U].
398. Samuel P. Jordan, Federalism, Democracy, and the Challenge of Ferguson, 59 ST. LOUIS
U. L.J. 1103, 1112–13 nn.41–42 (2015).
399. See NAT’L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, LEGISLATORS’ RACE AND ETHNICITY
(2015), http://www.ncsl.org/Portals/1/Documents/About_State_Legislatures/Raceethnicity_Rev2.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q8BP-4F6X].
400. See supra INTRODUCTION.
401. See supra Part II.
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deferential.402 Courts inquire whether the executive’s declaration was
made in good faith and whether there was a factual basis for it.403 The
Supreme Court first dealt with a challenge to a state level state of
emergency in the early 1900s in Moyer v. Peabody, when the Colorado
Governor declared an emergency in connection to a miner’s strike.404 In
Moyer, the plaintiff argued that the Governor and the National Guard
violated his due process rights when he was arrested and held for over two
weeks with no criminal charges because of his post as president of the
Federation of Miners.405 The Court established a highly deferential review
of a governor’s decision to declare a state of emergency by stating that
“the governor’s declaration that a state of insurrection existed is
conclusive of that fact.”406 When assessing the propriety of the plaintiff’s
detention pursuant to the emergency declaration, the Court distinguished
with approval the precautionary purpose of the plaintiff’s arrest as opposed
to a regular arrest which requires probable cause.407 Referencing the
Governor’s power to suppress insurrection pursuant to the Colorado
constitution and accompanying statutes, the Court stated that “he shall
make the ordinary use of the soldiers to that end; that he may kill persons
who resist, and, of course, that he may use the milder measure of seizing
the bodies of those whom he considers to stand in the way of restoring
peace.”408 In Moyer, the only caveat that the Court seemingly placed on
the power of the Governor was that he act in good faith. The language of
the opinion further suggests lack of any judicial review and instead the
need to “substitut[e] [] executive process for judicial process.”409
The next time the Supreme Court considered the issue in Sterling, it
did exert some judicial limits on the range of a governor’s actions pursuant
to an emergency.410 Thus, a reading of Moyer that displaces any judicial
review of a governor’s emergency power proved too broad. While the
Court in Sterling still did not question the Texas Governor’s conclusion
that an emergency existed, the Court reviewed the executive’s resulting
actions.411 In that case, the Governor alleged an insurrection from a dispute
402. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84–85 (1909); Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 399–
400 (1932).
403. Sterling, 287 U.S. at 400; see also Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247–48 (1974).
404. Moyer, 212 U.S. at 82–84.
405. Id. at 83.
406. Id. at 84.
407. Id. at 84–85.
408. Id. at 84
409. Id. at 85; see also Jason Collins Weida, A Republic of Emergencies: Martial Law and
American Jurisprudence, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1397, 1412–14 (2004).
410. Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378, 403–04 (1932).
411. Id. at 395–402.
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relating to oil production and issued “martial law” in the state.412 The
Texas Railroad Commission had issued an order limiting oil production
which plaintiff oil producers challenged in federal district court. In an
attempt to override the judicial process, the Governor—pursuant to martial
law—ordered the National Guard to shut down the oil wells.413 Looking
past the question of what the Governor meant by martial law, the Court
did not quarrel with the Governor’s power to call in military forces to keep
the peace, stating, consistent with Moyer, that “his decision to that effect
is conclusive.”414
Despite the Supreme Court’s reference to the district court’s findings
on the record that there was no actual uprising, no threats of violence, and
that at most there were potential breaches of the peace, neither the
Supreme Court nor the district court questioned the Governor’s
proclamation of an insurrection and his general use of military power.415
Still, the Court recognized that plaintiffs had a property right in their oil
that could not be curtailed without due process of law and rejected the
Texas Governor’s argument that the judiciary could not review any of his
actions because of the proclaimed emergency.416 Instead, the Supreme
Court clarified that “the allowable limits of military [and executive]
discretion, and whether or not they have been overstepped in a particular
case[] are judicial questions.”417 The Court then concluded that the
Governor had “overstepped” by curtailing the plaintiffs’ constitutional
access to courts to vindicate their property rights and that there was “no
military necessity” to prevent or limit lawful oil production.418 Sterling
thus established that a governor’s emergency declaration does not mitigate
the court’s jurisdiction over executive actions when they contravene
constitutional rights.419 While the court will not question a governor’s
good faith declaration of emergency, it can assess whether the specific
executive actions, pursuant to that declaration, were “related to the
quelling of the disorder” and necessary.420

412. Id. at 387. It is also worth noting that prior to the Governor’s order, the federal district court
had issued a temporary protective order preventing the execution of an order by the state’s Railroad
Commission limiting oil production. Id.
413. Id. at 387–88.
414. Id. at 399.
415. See id.
416. Id. at 393.
417. Id. at 401.
418. Id. at 401, 403.
419. Id. at 400–02.
420. Id. at 400, 403–04 (“the findings of fact made by the District Court . . . leave no room for
doubt that there was no military necessity which, from any point of view, could be taken to justify the
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In the midst of vigorous anti-government protests, the Supreme
Court heard the Scheuer case and concluded that it was error for the lower
court to assume, without any actual inquiry, that the Governor was acting
in good faith when declaring and executing a state of emergency.421 Four
years before, the Court had refused to hear a case dealing with the
Philadelphia mayor’s declaration of emergency after the assassination of
Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr.422 In his dissent from the dismissal of appeal,
Justice Douglas noted that the declaration contained no factual findings
regarding threats to peace or public safety.423 When the Court did hear
Scheuer, it faulted the lower court for assuming, without any inquiry, that
the Governor’s acts were in good faith.424 Scheuer involved the National
Guard officers’ shooting and killing of Kent State University students
protesting the Vietnam War after the Ohio Governor’s declaration of a
state of emergency.425 The Court found that it was error for the district
court to grant the defendant government officials’ motion to dismiss and
lamented that, at the early stage of the proceedings, the petitioners were
not allowed to contest the assumption of good faith given that the
government had not introduced evidence of the executive’s intent.426 The
Court stated that while “a declaration of emergency by the chief executive
of a State is entitled to great weight[,] . . . it is not conclusive.”427 Notably,
however, Scheuer provided no guidance regarding how a court should
evaluate a governor’s actions when engaging in this inquiry. This type of
guidance is essential. Without direction from the Supreme Court, judges
feel generally ill-equipped to gauge executive actions at a time of
perceived crisis, and neglect to do so out of worry that these matters are

action of the Governor in attempting to limit complainants’ oil production, otherwise lawful.”); see
also Weida, supra note 409, at 1416.
421. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 249–50 (1974). The Court also clarified in Scheuer that
neither the governor nor other state officials acting under color of law have absolute immunity from
suit for their unconstitutional actions during a state of emergency. Id. at 237.
422. Stotland v. Pennsylvania, 398 U.S. 916, 917, 920–21 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
423. Justice Douglas stated that the lower courts justified the mayor’s declaration of emergency
“by [the] various scattered acts of disorder occurring in the City of Philadelphia . . . such as a window
breaking, damage to automobiles, false alarms of fire, and jostling of pedestrians, some of which
occurred incident to demonstrations.” Id. at 917. In response to the killing of Rev. Martin Luther King,
Jr., the mayor declared a state of emergency in Philadelphia making it illegal for twelve or more people
to gather outdoors, causing individuals to be arrested while participating in three peaceful protests. Id.
Justice Douglas faulted the rest of the Court for the denying cert for lack of federal question, citing
serious constitutional concern related to the emergency declaration. Id. at 920–21.
424. Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 249–50.
425. Id. at 234–35.
426. Id. at 249–50.
427. Id. at 250.
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political rather than judicial questions.428 This worry stems from the
following factors: the fact that police powers rest in the executive, judges’
reticence to review gubernatorial decisions made under the pressure of an
allegedly impending crisis, public safety concerns, and fear of massive
disorder.429
Since Scheuer, the Supreme Court has not considered another
challenge to a state level emergency declaration. Lower courts dealing
with these challenges have generally upheld state and local executive
declarations of a state of emergency.430 Further, in the single post-Scheuer
case where a lower court ruled that a governor’s emergency declaration
was inappropriate, the Governor of the U.S. Virgin Islands did not allege
a public safety threat. Instead, he attempted to bypass a government
contracts bidding process by claiming that the need to comply with a
federal court order to repair wastewaters systems amounted to an
emergency.431 Courts have resisted placing any language or explicit
emergency findings requirements on a governor’s order.432
428. See United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1282 (4th Cir. 1971). While the Fourth Circuit
decided Chalk prior to the Scheuer opinion, more recent cases have cited to Chalk as support for
refusing to inquire into the state level emergency declaration. See Smith v. Avino, 91 F.3d 105, 109
(11th Cir. 1996) (discussing Chalk and the Hurricane Andrew curfew); Moorhead v. Farrelly, 727 F.
Supp. 193 (V.I. 1989); see also Diane P. Wood, The Bedrock of Individual Rights in Times of Natural
Disaster, 51 HOW. L.J. 747, 757–58 (2008) (discussing that courts are unlikely to “second-guess” the
executive’s determination regarding whether a state of emergency has concluded).
429. Chalk, 441 F.2d at 1281–82.
430. See Cal. Corr. Peace Officers Ass’n v. Schwarzenegger, 77 Cal. Rptr. 3d 844 (Cal. Ct. App.
2008); Martin v. Mun. Court, 196 Cal. Rptr. 218 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983); State ex rel. Mo. Highway and
Transp. Comm’n v. Pruneau, 652 S.W.2d 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); State v. Pearson, 975 So. 2d 646
(La. Ct. App. 2007); In re Farrow, 754 A.2d 33 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2000); Cougar Bus. Owners Ass’n
v. State, 97 P.2d 481 (Wash. 1982).
431. In United States v. Virgin Islands, 363 F.3d 276 (3d Cir. 2004), the Governor declared a
state of emergency, dispensing with the government contracts bidding process usually required, and
then negotiated a contract for wastewater systems repairs to a private company. Id. at 279. There was
evidence that the “contract was likely tainted by political corruption.” Id. The court concluded that no
justification was provided by the Governor regarding why the requirement of repairing the wastewater
system amounted to an emergency. Id. at 290; see also Hatton v. Mun. de Ponce, No. RE-91-37, 1994
WL 909605 (P.R. 1994). In Hatton, the municipal finance director of the town of Ponce, Puerto Rico,
awarded a medical equipment contracts to a private company without undergoing the required bidding
process. Id. By the time the company attempted to deliver the medical equipment, the mayor and
municipal finance directors were no longer in office and the new administration refused to accept the
equipment. Id. In attempting to enforce the contract, the company alleged that there was a state of
emergency due to the municipality’s economic crisis at the time that the contract was awarded. Id. The
court in Hutton found that the conditions did not amount to an emergency and that no state executive
had declared an emergency. Id.
432. In Farrow, the Pennsylvania court found that although the Governor did not state in his
executive order that there was an “emergency” when he extended the deadline to file nominations for
a primary election due to “a sudden and severe winter storm,” the Governor had satisfied the statutory
requirements of the disaster emergency declaration by referencing inclement weather. Farrow, 754
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Even though courts will not seriously inquire into whether the
declaration of emergency was appropriate and routinely dismiss
challenges to the emergency declaration, federal courts remain open
during an emergency and will litigate claims by individuals requesting an
injunction based on a violation of their constitutional rights when a
government acts pursuant to an emergency. Thus, litigants often challenge
the specific constitutional rights violation by seeking court injunctions
against these practices, instead of confronting the emergency declaration
as a whole.433 In addition, emergency management officials and personnel
do not need to wait for an emergency declaration to act in a perceived crisis
and often take action prior to such declaration.434 Their directives may be
challenged whether or not an official state of emergency has been
declared.435

A.2d at 35–36. The court ignored the petitioner’s claim that the circumstances demonstrated that there
was no real emergency. Id. at 34–35. In Schwarzenegger, the California appellate court dismissed the
procedural argument that Governor Schwarzenegger was required to state that he had made a finding
that circumstances described in the relevant California statute existed to warrant the emergency.
Instead, “[i]ssuance of the [emergency] proclamation implies the governor has made the finding.
Therefore, it is sufficient if the proclamation sets forth circumstances that support the implied finding.”
Schwarzenegger, 163 Cal. App. 4th at 820; see also Martin, 148 Cal. App. 3d at 697 (stating no
findings are required under the California emergency statute).
433. See, e.g., Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1117–18 (9th Cir. 2005) (challenging
the WTO no-protest zone and mass arrests but not the mayoral emergency declaration); First Amended
Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and Declaratory Relief at 11,
Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 16-cv-406 (D.N.D. Feb. 27, 2018) (challenging police’s use of water
cannons and less than lethal weapons on water protectors in North Dakota but not the gubernatorial
emergency declaration); Franklin v. Missouri, No. 4:15-cv-01283, 2016 WL 366799 (E.D. Mo. Jan.
29, 2016) (challenging police officer’s use of a “beanbag round” to shoot a Ferguson protestor in the
eye but not the governor’s emergency declaration); Complaint at 1–14, Devereaux v. County of Saint
Louis, No. 4:15-cv-00553-RWS (E.D. Mo. Mar. 30, 2015) (challenging police restrictions on press
activity and aggressive arrests of journalists in Ferguson but not the gubernatorial emergency
declaration); Complaint at 1–3, Templeton v. Dotson, No. 4:14-cv-2019 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2014)
(challenging police use of chemical agents on Ferguson protestors but not the gubernatorial emergency
declaration); Complaint at 1–2, Abdullah v. County of Saint Louis, 52 F. Supp. 3d 936 (E.D. Mo.
2014) (No. 4:14-cv-1436) (challenging the keep moving order in Ferguson but not the gubernatorial
emergency declaration).
434. See supra Part II.
435. See, e.g., Complaint at 1, 14–27, Quraishi v. Saint Charles County, No. 4:16-cv-01320NAB (E.D. Mo. Aug. 15, 2016) (challenging police shooting at a journalist and police use of tear gas
against media during the Ferguson protests prior to the gubernatorial emergency declaration);
Complaint at 4–8, Powers v. City of Ferguson, No. 4:16-cv-01299 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 9, 2016)
(challenging unlawful and retaliatory arrests in Ferguson prior to the gubernatorial emergency
declaration); Complaint at 1–2, 5–6, White v. Jackson, No. 4:14-cv-01490 (E.D. Mo. Aug. 28, 2014)
(challenging aggressive and unlawful arrests in Ferguson prior to the gubernatorial emergency
declaration); Complaint at 1–5, Hussein v. County of Saint Louis, No. 4:14-cv-1410 (E.D. Mo. Aug.
18, 2014) (challenging police recording restrictions on media in Ferguson occurring prior to the
gubernatorial emergency declaration).
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As discussed in Part III, plaintiffs sought judicial relief in various
cases alleging constitutional violations in the WTO, Ferguson, and North
Dakota pipeline protests.436 Even where plaintiffs ultimately obtained
beneficial rulings or injunctions, the relief did not sufficiently vindicate
constitutional violations because it arrived too late or was ignored by
officials. In the largest WTO litigation—the Menotti case—175 protestors
received a settlement, but it was not until seven years after their
unconstitutional arrest.437 Ferguson examples include the challenges to the
“keep moving” practice where the court granted an injunction about two
months after police engaged in the practice,438 and challenges to police use
of tear gas against protestors which occurred for five months before the
court issued a temporary restraining order against the practice.439 The main
lawsuit challenging aggressive government response to pipeline protests,
Dundon v. Kirchmeier, was filed in late 2016 and the resolution is still
unclear, as litigation is pending.440 As the preceding litigation
demonstrates, even where a court does intervene to stop constitutional
rights abuses, there is a timeliness problem. The court does not respond in
real time to piecemeal challenges of emergency practices and orders.
There are delays associated with the filings of pleadings, obtaining a
hearing, and a judge rendering a decision. During these delays, the
potentially unconstitutional government activity and resulting abuses
continue.
Plaintiffs can also bring actions for constitutional rights violations
against governments and state officials acting under color of law pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.441 However, expansive immunity principles allow
436. See supra Part III.
437. Young, supra note 256. Three plaintiffs in the Menotti matter received settlements about a
year after the WTO and withdrew from the lawsuit. See Stipulation & Order for Entry of Partial
Judgment in Favor of Plaintiffs Russell, Holloway and Matyjas, Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d
1113 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 7, 2000) (No. 2:00-cv-372-BJR).
438. See Abdullah v. County of Saint Louis, 52 F. Supp. 3d 936 (E.D. Mo. 2014).
439. The DOJ report documented and discussed the improper use of tear gas against protestors
beginning on August 10, 2014. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at xvi–xvii, 10–18, 26–29, 47–51.
The Templeton complaint against police and the City was not filed until December 8, 2014. See
Complaint at 1, Templeton v. Dotson, No. 4:14-cv-2019 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 8, 2014). The court issued
the temporary restraining order on December 11, 2014. Temporary Restraining Order at 1, Templeton,
No. 4:14-cv-2019 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 11, 2014).
440. See Civil Rights Class Action Complaint for Damages and Injunctive and Declaratory
Relief at 2, Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 16-cv-406 (D.N.D. Nov. 28, 2016). The court did initially
deny plaintiffs’ request for a restraining order, see Order Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
Injunction, Dundon, No. 16-cv-406 (D.N.D. Feb. 7, 2018), but plaintiffs filed an amended complaint
highlighting that they were protesting on public land and the case is ongoing. See First Civil Rights
Class Action Amended Complaint at 2, Dundon, No. 16-cv-406 (D.N.D. Feb. 27, 2018).
441. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012).
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certain defendants to escape liability. Under the doctrine of sovereign
immunity, state governments cannot be sued unless they consent to it.442
A state may waive sovereign immunity, which is determined by looking
at that state’s law.443 Thus, litigants will often be unable to assert tort
claims against the state itself, or those claims may be dismissed by the
court due to sovereign immunity.444 State officials are also protected from
Section 1983 liability by qualified immunity, which serves as expansive
protection since it applies when the court determines that the official’s
behavior is not in violation of a “clearly established statutory or
constitutional right[]” that he should have known.445 For example, Fourth
Amendment excessive force cases against police officers are quite
complicated. Judges often rule that these claims cannot proceed to trial
because of expansive qualified immunity principles which establish that
police cannot be sued for using unconstitutional excessive force if an
officer could reasonably misunderstand the constitutionary boundary.446
Because judges must look at excessive force claims in a factually specific
and highly “particularized” manner,447 victims of unconstitutional
excessive force claims must point to a preceding case where a court has
ruled factually similar police conduct unconstitutional, or the officer will
escape litigation.448 Section 1983 lawsuits claiming that police unlawfully
arrested protestors in violation of the Fourth Amendment are also
challenging because in most federal circuits qualified immunity will shield
officers that courts find had arguable probable cause to arrest, even when
the officers were actually mistaken.449 Finally, when litigants allege that
their First Amendment rights were violated by an unlawful arrest in
retaliation for speech, courts will find an officer immune from suit if there

442. See U.S. CONST. amend. XI; Hans v. State of Lousiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
443. Hans, 134 U.S. at 16–21.
444. See, e.g., Opinion, Memorandum & Order at 7, 9, Franklin v. State of Missouri, No. 4:15cv-1283 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 29, 2016).
445. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816–18 (1982); see Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335
(1986); see also Wood v. Moss, 572 U.S. 744, 757–61 (2013) (querying whether Secret Services
officers should have known that the perimeter that they established for the presidential motorcade
clearly violated activists’ First Amendment rights, before concluding that federal officers had qualified
immunity from Bivens suit for constitutional violations).
446. See Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004).
447. Id. at 198–99.
448. See Avidan Y. Cover, Reconstructing the Right Against Excessive Force, 68 FLA. L. REV.
1773, 1791–93 (2016).
449. Tal J. Lifshitz, “Arguable Probable Cause”: An Unwarranted Approach to Qualified
Immunity, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1159, 1178–1180 (2011) (stating that courts in the “First, Second,
Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth and . . . Eleventh Circuit[s] have embraced the ‘arguable’ language in
their qualified immunity analyses”).
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is arguable probable cause that justifies the arrest.450 In Menotti v. City of
Seattle, the district court initially granted several officers qualified
immunity on First and Fourth Amendment claims, which the Ninth Circuit
ultimately reversed, allowing the case to proceed to trial against police
officer defendants.451 In Dundon v. Kirchmeier, defendants in North
Dakota have argued in their pending motions to dismiss that police officers
“are entitled to qualified immunity as any right allegedly violated was not
so clearly established at the time of the violation that a reasonable officer
would have known that his actions were unlawful.”452
C. Devising a More Protective Mechanism to Check the Executive’s
Power in Response to Protest
The three case narratives demonstrate that when protest is the crisis,
the emergency declaration provokes and justifies violations of protestors’
First and Fourth Amendment rights. The best solution would be to for the
courts to apply more exacting review than good faith to executive
emergency declarations and orders invoked in response to protests. This
would recognize the fundamental place that political protests have in
American democratic society. To quote Justice Brandeis again,
Those who won our . . . revolution were not cowards. . . . They did
not exalt order at the cost of liberty. . . . Only an emergency can
justify repression [of speech]. . . . The fact that speech is likely to
result in some violence or in destruction of property is not enough to
justify its suppression. There must be the probability of serious injury
to the State. Among free men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied
to prevent crime are education and punishment for violations of the
law, not abridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly.453

However, the assurance that speech and assembly will not be
abridged during vigorous protest is an empty promise when an executive
has unrestrained authority to declare an emergency, and his decision faces
minimal judicial scrutiny. A more appropriate judicial assessment would
subject the executive’s emergency declaration when enacted during mass
protests to heightened review. Courts would evaluate the circumstances on
these grounds, analyze any factual support the executive cites in his
450. Katherine Grace Howard, You Have the Right to Free Speech: Retaliatory Arrests and the
Pretext of Probable Cause, 51 GA. L. REV. 607, 621–22 (2017).
451. Menotti v. City of Seattle, 409 F.3d 1113, 1119, 1151–57 (9th Cir. 2005).
452. Memorandum of Law in Support of Defendants Kyle Kirchmeier, Morton Cty., City of
Mandan, Jason Ziegler, Stutsman Cty., and Chad Kaiser’s Second Motion to Dismiss at 1, 20–30,
Dundon v. Kirchmeier, No. 16-cv-406 (D.N.D. Apr. 6, 2018); see also Memorandum of Law in
Support of Defendants Kyle Kirchmeier, Morton Cty., City of Mandan, Jason Ziegler, Stutsman Cty.,
and Chad Kaiser’s Motion to Dismiss, Dundon, No. 16-cv-406 (D.N.D. Feb. 6, 2017).
453. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377–78 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
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declaration, inquire whether there is an impending threat to the state, and
examine whether there are more narrowly tailored means to control the
threat than an emergency declaration. This review would prove more
protective of protest activity than a lax good faith standard.
State and local government executives will have objections to this
mechanism. They may cite separation of powers concerns; however,
emergency declarations are not currently immune from judicial review.
Thus, the precedent supports courts evaluating the executive’s actions. It
is a fair assertion that the courts’ review of these orders has been highly
deferential because of judges’ concerns about the need for immediate
action and the perceived unfairness of evaluating the governors’ actions in
hindsight.454 I am not suggesting that state and local executives obtain
judicial approval before making an emergency declaration. The Sixth
Circuit has already rejected the proposition of a judicial prior restraint of
a governor’s ability to declare an emergency.455 Furthermore, the
exigencies may demand a quicker response than a court can provide.456
Still, individuals should be able find pertinent recourse within the courts
for overbroad emergency declarations that suppress their ability to protest.
This heightened judicial review would help protect the rights of
demonstrators when the protest is the purported emergency. However, it
is not enough. As my discussion of the events in Ferguson demonstrates,
executives and first responders sometimes react immediately in aggressive
crisis mode when the prospect of an emergency declaration looms.457 Law
enforcement feed the information loop and can shape top executive and
emergency management officers’ understanding of the nature of protests
and protestors, thus making an emergency declaration a certainty.458 The
governor (or mayor) must tune in and obtain guidance from individuals
whose focus is the protection of protest activity. I propose a council that
will advise the executive on how to more fairly respond to protests in a
manner that is protective of the individual liberties of protestors. Chief
executives and emergency officials will wield their authority more
judiciously with the counsel of relevant experts. Thus, the emergency
advisory council should convene whenever a jurisdiction’s executives and
emergency management personnel respond to mass protests.
454. See Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932); Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909);
United States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1282 (4th Cir. 1971).
455. See Morgan v. Rhodes, 456 F.2d 608, 610 (6th Cir. 1972), rev’d on other grounds by Gillian
v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).
456. Smith v. Avino, 866 F. Supp. 1399, 1404 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (stating that “dealing with . . . an
emergency situation requires an immediacy of action that is not possible for judges” (quoting United
States v. Chalk, 441 F.2d 1277, 1281 (4th Cir. 1971))).
457. See supra Part III.
458. See supra Part II.
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The main duty of this council would be to advise the chief executive
and engage with emergency management personnel on the handling of a
perceived crisis associated with public protests, with a particular emphasis
of protecting First and Fourth Amendment rights. This duty should dictate
the protest council membership in terms of numbers and expertise.
Because the council must be able to respond quickly and fairly to a
perceived exigency, membership should cap at a small number, in addition
to the top emergency management official. Any greater number would be
unwieldy and hamper decision making. Regarding the council’s expertise,
members should be knowledgeable in areas of constitutional law, conflict
management, policing, and cultural competence. Council members may
include the following:
 Civil Rights Attorney459
 Police Representative (with special training in de-escalation,
implicit bias, and cultural competence)460
 Social Media Expert461
Missing from this list is an expert in negotiation and conflict
resolution. This is a neutral individual not embroiled in the issue either
from the government’s or protestors’ perspectives but with the skills to
help these groups reach a peaceful resolution. My early research suggests

459. A civil rights attorney would advise on the constitutionality of proposed government
emergency action. The DOJ Report on Ferguson concluded that legal counsel should be involved in
the development of police procedures employed during protests to prevent infringement on
individuals’ constitutional rights. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 125.
460. The DOJ Report on Ferguson highlighted that community discontent was spurred not only
by the shooting, but also because of the already tense relationship between Ferguson police and the
communities of color it policed; the Report recommended that police receive training on “procedural
justice, implicit bias, [and] cultural diversity[.]” Id. at 116. The Report further found that police who
directed the response to the Ferguson protests did not receive enough training on de-escalation and
problem solving. Id. at 68. “[D]e-escalation techniques are designed to nonviolently resolve conflict
that has already manifested.” Brandon Garrett, A Tactical Fourth Amendment, 103 VA. L. REV. 211,
265 (2017). I suggest that police who receive this type of training are best suited for a position in the
council.
461. In its Ferguson report, the DOJ concluded that the government did not use social media
effectively. DOJ FERGUSON REP., supra note 5, at 97–104. The government can use social media in
various ways, ranging from communication to surveillance. See id. After its assessment of the police
response to the protests in Ferguson, Amnesty International recommended that police seek to
communicate with protestors before and during protests to “create mutual understanding and prevent
violence.” AMNESTY INT’L FERGUSON REP., supra note 1, at 19. In this council, the social media expert
would seek to communicate accurately with the community and protestors to manage and de-escalate
the situation. Using social media for surveillance and other nefarious purposes would have the opposite
effect of increasing distrust between community and protestors and the government.
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that a conflict resolution specialist,462 a community mediator,463 or a crisis
negotiator464 could possess these skills. Also missing is a protest leader.
This omission is due to the fact that council membership must be
determined before any crisis so that the council can convene and act
quickly. However, among the responsibilities of some of the experts—
particularly the civil rights attorney and negotiator—council members
should be seeking out engagement from these individuals either by having
them sit on the council or communicating their perspectives.
To provide for the best possible action, the council should establish
appropriate protocols and structures to respond before any crisis
associated with public protest. The council might agree on what factors
must be present before taking emergency action, how to tailor the action
to protect constitutional liberties, degree of threats, necessary training,
drills, etc.
An open question is how this council would come into effect. At the
state level, a governor might recognize the benefits of receiving this expert
advice and choose to voluntarily institute the council. A politically savvy
executive could foresee as a benefit the fact that the council may provide
political cover when engaging in a controversial emergency action.
Although this is a risk, the benefit of exerting influence on the form and
manner of emergency action might be worth it.
Nevertheless, a problem with a council that is voluntarily instituted
by the executive may be that the council may not be able to bind the
governor or mayor. Also, a successor unwilling to share executive
emergency power might dismantle the council. Thus, to create a
permanent body to effectively check on the chief executive’s power, state
legislatures should enact the council. Some may assert that separation of
powers questions are associated with such legislative action. Nevertheless,
in states where the executive already shares emergency authority with the
legislature—because lawmakers can initiate, terminate, or need to approve
continuation of the emergency—the existing structure of emergency
power may suggest that there are no separation of powers concerns. In
462. See ASS’N FOR CONFLICT RESOLUTION, Ethical Principles (May 2010), https://acrnet.org
/page/EthicalPrinciples [https://perma.cc/BQB4-Q2J9].
463. See NAT’L ASS’N FOR CMTY. MEDIATION, Purpose, https://www.nafcm.org/page/Purpose
[https://perma.cc/U6TF-CNRE].
464. See Jeff Thompson, Hostage and Crisis Negotiators: Nonverbal Communication Basics,
PSYCHOL. TODAY (Aug. 13, 2013), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/beyondwords/201308/hostage-crisis-negotiators-nonverbal-communication-basics [https://perma.cc/3CGJX644]; see also Kerry Shaw, I Was a Crisis Negotiator for 23 Years. Here’s What It’s Like to Talk
Down an Armed Hostage Taker, TRACE (Aug. 25, 2016), https://www.thetrace.org
/2016/08/crisis-negotiator-armed-hostage-taker/ [https://perma.cc/LK6Q-59BD].
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addition, legislatively created councils already exist in multiple state
jurisdictions.465 These councils provide policy advice to the governor
related to certain natural disasters or hazardous waste.466 While the council
I suggest is admittedly different because it would be engaged in guiding
decision making during the perceived crisis—the protest—both the
existence of statutorily enacted councils and the fact that lawmakers do
possess emergency authority suggest that the conception of a protest
council has a precedent. In any event, the granular separation of powers
question is beyond the scope of the current paper.
CONCLUSION
Whether it is asylum seekers at the southern border or protestors on
the city streets, the concept of emergency is malleable. At the state level,
constitutions and statutes set no real parameters on what amounts to an
emergency. This is dangerous for constitutional liberties when the
emergency is mass public dissent. Moreover, emergency management
mechanisms do not require a threshold legal emergency before authorities
respond to a perceived crisis. Law enforcement can call in excess police
from surrounding jurisdictions via mutual aid agreements, utilize military
grade equipment and tactics against activists, and employ existing laws to
effectuate arrest. Once the executive declares an emergency, it aggravates
the use of oppressive police tactics and also expands executive power.
State and local officials can institute a curfew, close public streets to
dissent, arrest for failure to adhere to emergency orders, deviate from
regular procedures and institute ad hoc rules, and call in the National
Guard. When the protest is the emergency, the protest narratives
demonstrate that the result is pervasive suppression of protest activity in
violation of our constitutional rights and founding principles. A solution
that serves to protect speech and assembly rights must occur on both
judicial and executive fronts. First, government executives’ responses to
mass protests should be guided by an expert emergency council whose
goals include protection of constitutional liberties and de-escalation.
Second, courts should scrupulously scrutinize any emergency declared in
response to protests. This prescription will better preserve the freedom to
vigorously dissent while in search of our American ideals.

465. CRS REPORT SUMMARY, supra note 16, at CRS-4.
466. Id. at CRS-6 to CRS-8.

